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ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

I. The Moslem Peoples of China

Although the contrary view may be widely held, China is not a nation inhabited by a single people speaking a single language. While 90 to 95 per cent of the total population are Han Chinese (i.e., Chinese proper), the remainder comprise an intricate mosaic of races, languages, cultures and religions. The Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek fostered the theory that China was inhabited by a single Chunghua (Chinese) nation but the Communists, led by Chen Po-ta, a leading Communist theoretician, have realistically admitted China's character as a multinational state. Various Chinese Communist sources have noted the existence of over 60 minority nationalities, ranging from 1,000 Oluchuns to more than six million Chuangs, while the Academica Sinica has recorded 34 languages for research purposes.

The present regime recognizes ten Moslem nationalities: Hui, 1/ Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Tatar, Uzbek, Tunghsiang, Paoan, 2/ and Salu (or Salar), each with its own culture, history, traditions, and language. 3/ Official Communist sources indicate that they number approximately ten million, distributed as follows: 4/

Hui	3,559,300	Tunghsiang	140,000
Uighur	3,640,125	Salar	90,000
Kazakh	470,000	Uzbek	13,000
Kirghiz	80,000	Tatar	6,000
Tajik	15,000	Paoan	4,000

It is impossible to say how accurate these figures are since no reliable census of Moslems has ever been taken. Almost every writer on the subject has his own idea as to China's Moslem population and very seldom do their figures agree, varying from less than 10 million to as high as 50 million. The latter figure is that generally cited by Moslem writers 5/ and by Moslem Chinese themselves, although Chinese Moslem spokesmen today dutifully echo the 10 million figure officially recognized by the regime. In between are such estimates as

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15 million by Fessmann, 6/ 13 million by Bodde, 7/ and 23 million by Lindbeck. 8/

Roughly half of China's Moslems are located in the five northwestern provinces of Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia and Shensi, where they comprise about half of the total population. The greatest concentration is in Sinkiang where almost 94 per cent of the people are Moslem, with the Uighurs alone accounting for 74 per cent of the whole. The remainder are scattered throughout the land, with every province without exception having its Moslem colony, either small or large. In Yunnan Province, in southeast China, is the second largest concentration, where they account for about 25 per cent of the total population of the province. 9/ Peking, the capital, counts more than 70,000, served by 49 mosques; Mukden, in Manchuria, with 40,000 Moslems and eight large mosques, is virtually a Moslem city; in Shanghai are to be found 120,000 believers with 14 cathedral mosques. Similarly, every other large city has its own colony. That in Canton, numbering 2,500, is said to be the oldest in China, dating back to Arab contacts with T'ang China in the seventh century.

As was mentioned above, the Uighurs are concentrated in Sinkiang, where they form a majority. The Kazakhs and Tatars are found chiefly in the Ashan, Ili, Tacheng, Urumchi and Hami areas of that province, with other Kazakh groups being located in Ninho hsien of Chinghai. The Kirghiz and Uzbeks inhabit various hsien in Sinkiang, while the Tajiks are chiefly in the Puli, Soche, and Pushan hsien of the Pamir plateau in Sinkiang. The Tunghsiangs and Salars are chiefly to be found in the Kansu-Chinghai border area, while the Paoans live in areas near Tibet. The Hui comprise the greater majority of Moslems elsewhere in China.

The 10 nationalities mentioned above represent several racial strains. The Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tatars are of Turkish stock akin to the peoples of Soviet Central Asia, and speak related Turkic dialects. The Tajiks are Iranian and are related to the people of Soviet Tadzhikistan. The Salars are descendants of immigrants from Samarkand, while the Paoans are Tibetans. The Hui are essentially Chinese by race but, in many cases, with a considerable admixture of other racial strains: Turkish, Arab and Mongolian. In northwest China, it might be noted, Moslems who are Chinese by language and culture, as well as by race, are known as Tungans;

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and between them and other Moslems as well as Han Chinese there is a latent antipathy which has, in the past, frequently flared into open conflict.

Aside from their common faith, China's Moslems are solidified by occupational factors, for they have monopolized jade work and the fur trade, animal husbandry, horse-dealing and butchering. They provide most carters, muleteers, and cameleers, and are said to be the best restaurateurs and inn-keepers in China. In matters of dress, 10/ manners and customs, Moslems--especially the Hui--are frequently indistinguishable from other Chinese; often the avoidance of pork--a favorite food with Han Chinese--is the only major difference between them and the Han peoples.

Isolated from the main body of Islam for many centuries the Chinese Moslems have developed along their own lines, quite untouched by influences affecting the rest of Islam, and have become quite lax in matters of religious observances. The Five Pillars of the Faith are still recognized and observed but not always in a manner that would be regarded as orthodox by other Moslems. This isolation has also served to make them immune to any attraction by the Pan-Islam concept, which for them has no meaning. As elsewhere in the Moslem world there is no cleric hierarchy. Each mosque is independent, and the Moslems are in reality only a collection of separate congregations bound together by a common creed. The idea of a caliph is meaningless to the Chinese Moslem; to him the highest earthly spiritual authority is his own shaug. 11/

In matters of faith, Chinese Moslems are all Sunnites, with some Sufi influences, who follow the Hanafi school of law. But while all are Sunnites, they are divided into a number of sects which differ as to how prescribed Sunni rituals should be practiced. The "Old Sect" is the most conservative and, at the same time, most lax in dietary and moral habits. The "New Sect," already several hundred years old, tends to be more mystical and more ritualistic, opposing such things as opium smoking and wine drinking which the Old Sect is inclined to overlook. Other differences can be adduced. In general, the New Sect insists on a return to traditional Islamic ways, while the Old Sect prefers the modified customs and forms which have developed in China during the centuries of isolation. Thus, the New Sect insists that a chapter of the Koran be recited only once instead of three times as held by the Old Sect; that at prayer clasped hands should be raised

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once instead of twice; that after meals there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting; and that in singing the praises of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. The New Sect does not allow any substitute for an imam in preaching while the Old Sect does. Finally, the two groups disagree on the proper basis for calculating the ritual fasting period, the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arab method, the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar calendar.

A third main group, known as the Modern Sect, was founded about 30 years ago by a reformer who declared himself to be Christ returned to earth to prepare for the return of Mohammed. It is the most liberal of the three. In education it stresses religious ethics rather than the traditional memorizing of the Koran, and in the interpretation of the Koran maintains that the spirit rather than the letter should be observed. In personal habits it advocates modernism, such as the wearing of European clothes.

In the northwest area there also are many small sects, for example, the "Brand New Sect" and a number of Sufi orders such as the Che-ho-yeh (Jariya). 12/

II. Communist Policies

A. Minority Policy

Under the Kuomintang regime the Moslems as well as other non-Han peoples were frequently oppressed and persecuted as a result of the KMT policy of Sinification. The Communist regime has been less harsh in this respect, for it has pursued a deliberate policy of recognizing the existence and seeking the support of the many minority groups. The Moslems have profited thereby since the Reds treat them not only as a religious minority but also as minority nationalities. Thus they have escaped the harsh treatment accorded to Christians, whom the regime is apparently determined to reduce to impotence if not eradicate completely. Even the Buddhists, except in Tibet and adjacent areas, have been subjected to pressures which the Moslems have thus far escaped.

The Communist Chinese policy toward minorities is based on the early Russian nationalities policy (before it was corrupted and perverted by Great Russian chauvinism) and on Stalin's two sets of theses on the nationality problem as

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accepted by the X and XII Congresses of the CPSU in 1921 and 1923. The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which guided the policies of the CCP until the promulgation of a constitution in 1954, explicitly declares that all minorities are to be free to develop their own national languages, customs, religions and traditions, and states in Article 51 that:

> Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy organizations shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power. 12/

During the period in which the Communists were winning China from the Nationalist regime, they were careful to respect the rights of minorities. Upon entering areas inhabited by Moslems, Communist soldiers received special instructions to respect Moslem beliefs and customs, to avoid molestation of mosques and priests, and to avoid disturbing religious beliefs. Care also was taken to avoid feeding pork to Moslem units, while arrangements were made for Moslem soldiers to observe their religious obligations without hindrance.

The new Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, approved for promulgation on 14 June 1954, repeats the essential features of the Common Program. Sections 2 and 3 of Article 3 guarantee equal treatment to all nationalities, prohibit race discrimination, racial oppression, and activities that would destroy the friendly unity among them, and assure them the right to develop their own language and to preserve or reform their own customs and religion. Section 4 of the same article provides that national minorities are to have regional autonomy in areas where they are predominant. It is made clear, however, that these areas are inseparable parts of China and that the first loyalty of every citizen is to the People's Republic.

The minorities policy is carried out by the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress, 13/ which works closely with the CCP and the People's Revolutionary Military

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Council. The Commission holds periodic conferences of representatives from various national areas to consider their problems, but its most important task is to train Red cadres from minority groups, whose duty it is to insure party control in their areas. 15/ Within the State Council, or cabinet, there is also a Religious Affairs Bureau headed by Mo Cheng-hsiang. No information as to its mission is available, but it presumably handles government policy toward religious groups, which would include Islamic as well as Christian, Buddhist and others.

The policy directed by the above groups have fostered, as in the Soviet Union, the creation of individual alphabets (for those languages previously without one), the publication of books in national languages, and the organization of dance and art groups and other cultural activities. Medical care and communications in minority areas have been improved, and schools--primary, secondary, and advanced--established. In Peking there is now a Central Institute for Nationalities, while eight subordinate Institutes for Nationalities have been established throughout the country.

B. Benefits to Moslems

In the wooing of minority groups, the Moslems apparently have been especially favored. Mosques have been exempted from real estate taxes, while those of historical importance have been repaired at government expense. On 5 December 1950, the government issued a special order remitting the slaughter tax on cows and sheep killed by Moslems in connection with the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet and the festivals of Shakar Bairam (Id al-Fitr) and Gorban Bairam (Id al-Adha). During these same festivals state-owned stores and cooperative trading agencies gave special discounts to Moslems on such items as beef, mutton, rice, flour, tea, sugar and cloth. This favoritism apparently was not confined to festivals since Moslems in Peking reportedly were given adequate supplies of beef and mutton in the winter of 1953 even though there was a general meat shortage.

By government order, no Moslem student, worker or state employee is forced to work on a Moslem religious holiday. During the 1955 Bairams, Moslems were given a three-day holiday. At every state banquet and representative assembly there are special tables with Moslem food. The same convenience is

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also provided at many railway stations.

In the cultural field the Moslems have also made gains. In Peking an Institute of Islamic Theology has been established and also an Institute for Hui People which has more than one thousand students. The students at the Central Institute for Nationalities as well as at the subordinate regional institutes are largely Moslem. Moslems are also free to enter any other school. Mosques reportedly have been allowed to retain their religious schools. The Nationalities Publishing House is issuing a steady stream of publications in Moslem minority languages, although most of them are translations of Communist texts. Sinkiang has eight newspapers and three periodicals in Uighur and five newspapers in Kazakh. Both languages are now being used for radio broadcasts, and Uighur for the Sinkiang telegraphic service as well as on currency.

C. Disadvantages to Moslems

All this is not to say that the Moslems are free or that their customs and beliefs have not been affected by the Communist regime. Take marriage for example. The new marriage law of 1 May 1950 provides for marriage "based on free choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes" and prohibits "polygamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the remarriage of widows, and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage." These provisions strike at many facets of Moslem marriage practices. Moslems in China as elsewhere practiced polygamy. Parents also arranged marriages, now forbidden, and betrothed their children, which is now forbidden. 16/ The institution of bride-price or of dowery was likewise observed. The Koran also lays down certain restrictions as regards remarriage, which presumably can no longer be enforced among Moslem societies.

A more fundamental tenet of Islamic society everywhere--that no Moslem, particularly no Moslem girl, should marry outside the faith--is also apparently under attack. The government reportedly was encouraging Red cadres, in early 1954, to marry Moslems and, if such marriages were opposed by parents, to cite the provisions of the marriage law. Between January and July 1954, 40 such marriages are said to have occurred in the Harbin area alone. This would appear to be part of the Communist policy to disrupt the traditional family relationship and might well, were it pushed far and long enough, result in the absorption of the Moslem minorities.

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Although, as already noted, Moslem dietary laws appear to be tolerated and even abetted, the following incident reportedly occurred. The Peking regime decreed that animals should be electrocuted before being slaughtered. This procedure makes the meat unclean according to the rules prescribed by the Koran, and in February 1954 Moslems in Peking, Mukden and Harbin protested against the ruling in vain. It is probable that the decree had little effect in the heavily Moslem areas of northwest China, where many of the Moslems are animal raisers and therefore probably slaughter their own meat. However, as these areas become industrialized and modernized, more and more Moslems may be forced to eat meat which according to their religious precepts is unclean.

Refugees who have escaped from Sinkiang and various underground reports from China indicate that the Communists have closed down many mosques and seized them for use as museums, stores or barracks. Religious courts also are reported to have been abolished. It is difficult to evaluate these reports on the state of Islam in China, for Moslem spokesmen such as Burhan and Mohammed Makien continually are stressing the freedom with which Moslems practice their faith, and in this they are supported by many Moslems from other countries who have visited Red China in recent years.

The explanation may well lie in the existence of different sets of circumstances in Sinkiang and in the rest of China where foreigners are allowed to travel. Very few westerners have seen Sinkiang since the Communist take-over, but reports have filtered out that the province today is controlled by the Soviets rather than the Chinese Communists and that the garrison troops, for example, belong to the Red Army rather than to the Chinese Communist army. If this is true, it may well be that the Soviets are applying in Sinkiang the same type of campaign they applied in the Moslem areas of the Soviet Union, where the Moslem clergy has been largely eliminated and the majority of mosques closed.

Although the Chinese Communists deprecate religion, they have not announced an avowed campaign against religion as such or launched any organized drive to persuade Moslems to abandon their faith. 17/ There is, however, evidence that the Peking regime is attempting to control the content of mosque sermons. In 1953 the regime assigned a Moslem (presumably a reliable Communist) secretary to each mosque in Peking to

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observe and report on all activities. Each week, before the Friday sermon, the secretary gave the chief priest a copy of the week's important news, received from his superiors, which the priest was expected to incorporate into his sermon. The sermon itself had to be prepared in advance and submitted to the secretary for approval who was frequently asked by the chief priest to prepare it. Available information does not indicate whether this system is still in effect or whether it is peculiar to the Peking area.

The Communists also are making plans to control future Moslem clerics. Those graduated by the new Institute of Islamic Theology will be well indoctrinated. In early 1953 the regime ordered each mosque in Peking to select and send one student to a course of study at the Peking Moslem College, who, after graduation, would return to the original mosque to preach. Two principal qualifications for selection were listed: clear-mindedness and progressiveness; but nothing was said about proficiency in Arabic, which any qualified Moslem cleric must have. From early 1953 to July 1954, the government reportedly sent 60 Moslems, in groups of 20, to the USSR for training.

III. Moslem Resistance

From the Yenan days the CCP has made strenuous efforts to attract the support of China's Moslems. 13/ Success consistently eluded the Communists. Since achieving power in 1949, the Reds have made considerable concessions to that same end, and there are indications that complete success has still not been attained. Their parallel attempts to impose control and Communist discipline on people whose faith and discipline is already strong has created difficulties not encountered elsewhere.

Islamic exclusiveness based on claims of absolute religious truth and social values, buttressed by prohibition against marriage outside the faith, aloofness from religious and social activities of others, a self-segregated pattern of social life, and a well-developed solidarity and communal self-sufficiency makes friendly cooperation between Moslems and Chinese possible only on Moslem terms. Yet such aloofness is detrimental to China's national unity and modernization. In order to carry through national programs of reform, education and reconstruction

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and to meet external ideological and military threats, the activities of all groups in China need to be and are being collectivized and brought under national control.

Although the Communists may have won political and military control over China's Moslem areas, they have still to solve the problem of defining the status of China's Moslems and reconciling their aspirations and interests with their own demands. The Communists refuse to recognize the unique role of religion, which serves China's Moslems not only as a basis for communal life, but also as the critical differentiating factor between the Chinese-speaking Moslems and other Chinese and as the primary unifying force among the culturally and racially diverse peoples in China who are adherents to Islam. For ideological reasons the Communists are unable to offer the Moslems real religious freedom. They are willing to respect certain forms of religious beliefs and habits of individuals and groups, but they cannot accept a religiously ordered society without forgetting the establishment of their own political and economic system. This they are unwilling to do. It is cultural diversity, not Islam, which the Communists are willing to champion.

The Communists have not been able to solve the problem of the status of China's Moslems because the primary aim of their policies has been to promote their own power. Communist policies to win the voluntary support of the Moslems are inadequate because they are designed not to advance the interests of the Moslems but to use the Moslems. Only if Communists were willing to frame a broader program to safeguard religious unity and the racial diversity of the Moslems, could they succeed in reconciling Moslem interests and those of the CCP. Minority autonomy provides no solution, for such autonomy, if it is to be real and meaningful, is only possible after the Moslems have become loyal and participating members of the national state.

Although committed to respecting the autonomy of Moslem groups (as national minorities rather than as Moslems as such), the Communists still consider them as integral parts of Chinese society and therefore subject to the laws of the new regime. While there is no available data relative to this particular point, the elimination of so-called people's enemies probably has proceeded apace in Moslem areas as in other parts of China. Among the more than 20 million Chinese said to have

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been subjected to hsiao mieh, i.e., liquidation, there have undoubtedly been a proportionate number of Moslems. Forced delivery of crops and livestock, execution of landlords and rich peasants, and other aspects of Communist terror have been applied to them as to Han Chinese. Sinkiang and other areas of northwest China have witnessed mass public trials and executions just as have the large cities and areas of Eastern China.

There are indications that the blood-letting has perhaps been even greater among Moslems. The land reform class struggle has lagged behind in Moslem areas. The Communists made some provision for Moslem sentiments in this regard, 19/ but the concession made was not sufficient to prevent Moslem peasants from opposing other aspects of the program and from refusing to join in the persecution and condemnation of fellow Moslems who fell into the Communist classification of "rich" peasants. The Moslem areas also have been involved in segments of revolt and resistance. The largest open rebellion yet admitted by the Reds since they seized power was staged by more than 20,000 Moslems in Khamu Province between April and July 1952, where the rebels killed over 3,000 party cadres, civilians and military officers before being put down. 20/

The same area was also the scene of a serious revolt in 1950. On 23 March of that year, a congress of 1,000 Kazakh leaders at Barkol proclaimed an autonomous Kazakh government with Janim Khan as governor and Osman Batur as military commander. In mid-April, Communist forces swept down on Barkol and more than 12,500 of the 15,000 assembled Kazakhs were killed, captured, or dispersed. Janim Khan was captured shortly thereafter and taken to Urumchi where he was publicly executed in February 1951. Osman Batur met the same fate two months later. 21/

As a result of these incidents and of general dislike of the Communist regime, thousands of Kazakhs, as well as other Moslem tribesmen, have attempted to escape from Sinkiang to India, over the fearsome mountain barriers. Of one group of 22,000, only 3,000 reached safety in Kashmir. Those who have reached the outside world tell of thousands of others who have died in the attempt from cold and hunger or at the hands of Communist soldiers. They also tell of other thousands who would make the attempt if opportunity presented itself.

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Reports of these refugees and of their leaders such as Mohammed Amin Bughra, former Deputy Governor of Sinkiang, and Yusuf Isa Alptekin, although perhaps somewhat colored and exaggerated, make it quite clear that the Red reign of terror has not bypassed the Moslem areas. 12/ The specific oppressive measures are probably neither more stringent nor more lenient than for the rest of China; it is only that Moslem resistance is greater and more tenacious.

IV. Regional Autonomy

The Chinese Communists have resolutely pushed the autonomy program outlined in the Common Program and in the Constitution, so that today the administrative boundaries of the country present a complex array of autonomous regions (chʻu), districts (chou) and counties (hsien) mingled with regular administrative units. As of 1955, China had 22 provinces, three autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet), and the centrally administered cities of Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai. The provinces and autonomous regions, in turn, were divided into 25 autonomous chou, 8,100 hsien or equivalent units, about 50 autonomous hsien, and about 170 cities under provincial jurisdiction.

Among the autonomous areas are many inhabited by Moslem peoples; for example, Tunghsiang and Paoan areas in Kansu; Hui areas in Kansu, Chinghai and Suiyuan; Kazakh and Kirghiz areas in Sinkiang; as well as a number of others in addition to those with mixed populations. The autonomy accorded, however, would seem to be more apparent than real, for most minority group officials have empty titles and no power. The official Communist organ People's Daily admitted on 9 September 1953 that it was common practice for minorities not to be consulted by governmental organs dealing with their affairs and that often governors at a higher level ignored the autonomous areas under them.

Toward the end of 1949 the Peking regime inaugurated a system of regional governments, apparently designed to bind provincial governments closer to Peking and to aid in overcoming the handicaps which China's vast size, imperfect communications and general backwardness placed in the way of centralized administration. Five regional areas were created

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including that of Northeast China which embraced the five provinces of Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia and Shensi. Under the previous system of regular provincial governments Moslems could rightfully expect to exercise control in Sinkiang, perhaps also in Kansu and/or Chinghai. But within the area encompassed in the new regional government they represented something less than half the total population and were therefore condemned to function within that area and its centralized government as a permanent minority.

The situation improved in June 1954 when the regional administrative areas were abolished. On 1 October 1954, the province of Sinkiang was proclaimed the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, with Uighurs serving as chairman and a majority of the members of the Region's People's Council. As an autonomous region, it has the same status as a province but with additional powers. It can, for example, with the approval of the State Council in Peking, set up governmental bodies through which local autonomy can be exercised including the administration of its own finances and public security forces. Autonomy for non-Uighur peoples is assured by five autonomous chou and six autonomous hsien within the Region's borders.

It is extremely doubtful that the province's new status has materially helped its inhabitants. The political leaders are still subject to Communist orders--Saifudin, chairman of the People's Council is a CCP member--and if Peking is not exercising firm control there, it appears that the Soviets are.

V. Moslem Participation in Government

Moslems have not been conspicuous by their presence at the highest levels of government in Communist China. The most influential Moslem is perhaps Saifudin, formerly vice-chairman of the Sinkiang provincial government, who today is chairman of the People's Council of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and one of the two Moslem members of the State Council. Sharing honors with Saifudin is Burhan, who today is chairman of the China Islamic Association and who in the past has served as chairman of the Sinkiang provincial government and as vice-chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the CPPCC.

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The second Moslem member of the State Council is Liu Ke-ping, who also holds the posts of chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress and of chairman of the China Hui Cultural Association. Other prominent Moslems are Sheikh Nur Mohammed (Ta Pu-chang), a vice-chairman of the China Islamic Association, who previously was a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC and served as a member of the Chinese delegation attending the Bandung Conference in April 1954; and Mohammed Makien (Ma Chien), a professor of Arabic at Peking University and a graduate of Cairo's al-Azhar University. He is a leading committee member of the China Islamic Association and also served as a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC.

At the inception of the Communist regime, Moslems were represented in the CPPCC both in the "democratic religious circles" category (one delegate) and in the "minority nationalities" group (four delegates). The CPPCC's Nationalities Affairs Commission had three vice-chairmen of whom two were Moslem (a Hui and a Uighur), and 22 ordinary members of whom 13 were non-Chinese. (Available information does not indicate the number of Moslems among those 13.) When the First National People's Congress met in 1954, its members included 41 Moslems. Of the 65 members of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, 16 were Moslems.

On the local level in predominantly Moslem areas, the Islamic contingents are much greater; and in autonomous Moslem regions Moslems presumably constitute the greater majority of government officials. Nevertheless, in Communist China, as in the Soviet Union, there are few Moslems with national reputations or national responsibilities.

VI. Cultural Organizations

Communist China is a country of organizations--numerous, large and varied. The Communist leaders have found it expedient to accomplish their ends and to change the face and social structure of China by working through an endless variety of "mass organizations." Such groups as the New Democratic Youth, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, All-China Students' Federation, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, All-China Democratic Women's Federation, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and countless others number their members in the millions. The cooperative and peasants' associations reportedly have over 130 million members.

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These mass organizations today command much of the leisure time of the Chinese citizen. While there are no available figures on the breakdown of their memberships, these organizations probably include many Moslems. Branches in an area like Sinkiang, for example, where virtually the entire population is Moslem, would have primarily Moslem members.

The major purely Moslem organization is the China Islamic Association, 23/ formally inaugurated on 9 May 1953. The groundwork for the organization was laid at a Preparatory Conference in Peking on 27-31 July 1952, which had been called at the initiative of eight prominent Moslems, including Saifudin and Mohammed Makin. This conference was attended by 53 delegates from all parts of the country and represented the various Moslem nationalities. A 40-man preparatory committee was elected, headed by Burhan, with the task of getting the new organization into operation.

The China Islamic Association is a lay organization designed "to help the people's government to implement the policy of religious belief as laid down in the Common Program," and "to develop love for the Motherland ... and participate in the movement for the defense of world peace." In practice the association serves as an agency for handling the racial, religious, cultural and political relations of Moslems with the Communist regime, and as a convenient propaganda instrument for improving Chinese relations with countries of the Moslem world.

A second national Moslem organization is the China Hui Cultural Association, 24/ established on 14 May 1953, with the task of promoting the culture of the Hui people. The May 1953 conference which inaugurated the association, in a message addressed to Mao Tse-tung, expressed its mission in these words: "The China Hui Cultural Association will assist the People's Government in the study and development of the culture and education of the Hui people through strengthening patriotic education and mobilizing the Hui people to acquire scientific knowledge, production know-how, and advanced production experiences so as more effectively to contribute themselves in the large-scale economic construction of the Motherland, which has already begun."

Both associations seem largely to serve political rather than cultural purposes, especially as regards China's relations with countries of the Moslem World. In its first two

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years of existence, the China Islamic Association was host to leaders from the Near and Middle East and Africa on 15 different occasions. When foreign Moslem dignitaries are invited to China these guests, whether religious leaders, journalists, government leaders, labor leaders or businessmen, are feted and guided by leaders of the two groups. Chinese cultural missions to Moslem countries are led by, or include as members, leaders of these groups; for example, the current Chinese delegation in the Middle East is headed by Burhan.

Among China's numerous organizations are a number of "friendship associations." Here, too, Moslem leaders are used when a Moslem country is concerned. Burhan was a founder and currently serves as chairman of the China-Indonesia Friendship Association, while its vice-chairmen include Ma Yu-huai, one of Burhan's colleagues in the China Islamic Association. Liu Ke-ping and Ma Sung-ting, chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the China Hui Cultural Association, fill the same posts in the China-Pakistan Friendship Association.

Another example of the propaganda use of these organizations to curry favor among Moslems abroad is the action of the second plenary committee meeting of the China Islamic Association in November 1955, attended by 184 imams, mullahs and other leaders of the 10 Moslem nationalities, in adopting a resolution supporting independence for the Moslem peoples of North Africa.

The leaders of the two associations are used to inform the Moslem world how free China is and how much religious freedom is accorded Moslems there. Radio Peking frequently broadcasts statements to this effect attributed to Chinese Moslem leaders, and the good relations which China enjoys with Moslem countries. The diplomatic recognition recently extended by Egypt suggests that these propaganda efforts have not been entirely unsuccessful.

Along strictly religious and cultural lines the two associations also have been active to a degree. The China Islamic Association, for example, is charged with organizing the annual hajj to Mecca which in 1955 was led by Sheikh Nur Mohammed. The association also was instrumental in the establishment in Peking of the Institute of Islamic Theology, and has also arranged for the printing of a Chinese translation

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of the Koran. In its first two years, the association held 22 meetings of Imams and other Moslems to discuss religious questions and to celebrate, with due publicity abroad, Moslem festivals. Other activities include the translation of the new constitution into Arabic, the making of a documentary film on Moslem life in Peking, and the publication of a book depicting Moslem life in China.

There is no available information regarding the specific activities of the China Hui Cultural Association.

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VII. Notes

1. Moslems who are Chinese by race. The term is not to be confused with Hui Hui or Hui Chiao Jen which are used to denote China's Moslems collectively.

2. Tibetan-speaking Moslems.

3. The common language for all of China's Moslems is a-la-pi (Arabic), which is taught in all Moslem schools. Like Moslems everywhere China's Moslems refuse to recognize the validity of the Koran or of Moslem prayers in any language but Arabic.

4. Figures are taken from Theodore Shabad, China's Changing Map (New York, 1956). See also People's China, 5 June 1955.

5. For example, Ahmed Ali, Muslim China (Karachi, 1949).

6. Harrison Forman, "China's Moslems," Canadian Geographical Journal XXXVII (September, 1948).

7. Dirk Bodde, "China's Moslem Minority," Far Eastern Survey XV (11 September 1946).

8. John M. H. Lindbeck, "Communism, Islam, and Nationalism," Review of Politics XII (October, 1950).

9. The Moslems of Yunnan Province are sometimes referred to as Panthays.

10. The jen min chuang (people's uniform) is today common to all citizens of China.

11. Derived from the Persian word akhund, a scholar learned in Islamic law and theology. The ahungs show their status by a white turban or skull cap.

12. The best available account of China's Moslem sects is found in Chan Wing-tsit, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York, 1953).

13. See China Islamic Association, Moslems in China (Peking, 1953). The text of other pertinent articles is also given.

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14. Headed by Liu Ko-ping, a Hui Moslem. The former Nationalities Affairs Commission of the CPPCC was headed by Li Wei-han, also known as Lo Mai, who served at the same time as vice-chairman of the government's Committee of Financial and Economic Affairs and as head of the CCP's United Front Work Department.

15. Walker states that to date more than 100,000 such cadres have been trained, most of them youths. See Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism: The First Five Years (New Haven, Conn., 1955), p. 185.

16. The law fixes the legal age for marriage at 20 for men and 18 for women.

17. There have been reports of a Chinese Society for the Propagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge, apparently patterned after the Soviet atheistic organization of the same name.

18. For an account of Communist attempts to win over China's Moslems in the years before seizure of power in 1949, see Lindbeck, op. cit.

19. Moslem resistance to the land reform program was foreseen, and the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950 provided, in Article 3, that "Some or all land owned by Moslems may be retained by them subject to the consent of the Moslems residing in the area."

20. See Walker, op. cit., p. 137. A Spanish missionary who reached the Free World from Kansu Province in late 1952 reported that the Moslem rebellion in Northwest China still continued, that anti-Communists had controlled a mountainous area in Eastern Kansu for about 18 months, and that for political reasons the Chinese Communist leaders had not yet launched an all-out attack to crush it. However, the New York Times on 3 April 1953 carried a report that the Communists had made peace with the Kazakhs by promising them a tract of land to call their own and that Kazakh leaders had been among the chiefs of seven minority tribes in Northwest China to send their respects to Mao.

21. For an account of the Barkol rebellion, see Milton J. Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom," National Geographic Magazine 6 (November, 1954).

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22. Bughra has written an account of present conditions in Sinkiang, giving many details of Communist oppression and terroristic measures. See Mohammed Amin Bughra, Doğu Türkistan: Tarihi, coğrafi ve siyasi durum [Eastern Turkestan: Its History, Geography, and Present Condition] (Istanbul, 1952).

23. Not to be confused with the China Moslem Association, a pro-Chiang organization with headquarters in Taipei, Formosa, which was founded in Changshow in 1938 as the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation and which adopted its present name in 1942, after having absorbed all other existing Chinese Moslem organizations. See Appendix A for a list of the officers and committee members of the China Islamic Association.

24. The names China Islamic Cultural Association, or China Moslem Cultural Association, or Chinese Association for the Promotion of the Hui People's Culture are also used. See Appendix B for a list of officers and members.

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VIII. APPENDICES

A. China Islamic Association Officers and Members

B. China Hui Cultural Association Officers and Members

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APPENDIX A

CHINA ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION
OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS 1/

Name 2/	Numeral Code	Nationality
	Chairman	
Pan Fzh-han 3/*		Uighur
	Vice-Chairmen	
Tang Ching-jen*	2739/7234/0086	Hui
Ma Yu-huai 4/*	7456/3768/2469	Hui
Ta Fu-sheng 5/*	6671/3134/3932	Hui
Ma Chen-wu*	7456/7201/2976	Hui
I-ming-ma-ho-ma-ni 6/*	0181/2494/7456/0678/5634/2606	Uighur
	Secretary General	
Chang Yu-tsung 7/		
	Deputy Secretary General	
Ma Ming-chi*	7456/2494/1015	

1. FBIS Daily Report, 20 May 1953.
2. An asterisk denotes membership also on the Preparatory Committee. See FBIS Daily Report, 5 August 1952.
3. Usually known as Burhan. Chairman of the Preparatory Committee.
4. Also known as Yusf. Was Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.
5. Also known as Sheikh Nur Mohammed.
6. The 6 August FBIS report gives his name as I-ming-ma-ho-la-ma.
7. Also known as Mohammed Ali.

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Name	Numeral Code Numbers	Nationality
Chang Yu-chen 2/*	1728/3768/3771	Hui
Ma Chien 3/*	7456/1017	Hui
Yang Shih-chien	7594/1100/6179	Hui
Ma Hung-....	7456/7585/3294	Hui
Ma Ying-fu*	7456/1627/3240	Hui
Tao Yeu Chien	0455/1311/5389	Hui
Ma Chung-ying*	7456/6859/0932	Hui
Ma Pei-ching*	7456/1014/7290	Kelar
Pa Chen	3127/4176	Hui
Shen Kuie-hai	3948/6607/3536	Hui
Ku-ha-te-li	2606/0710.1/1779/6349	Kazakh
Ma Yu-tsai	7456/3733/7072	Hui
Chou Kuan-chun	0719/0939/6511	Hui
Ma Chi-shan*	7456/1477/1478	Tungkiang
Han Cheng-kung	7191/2073/4857	Panan
Ku-chia-ni-yu-tsu-o-sha1*	0149/0502/1441/3160/1320/1081/6470	Uighur
A-ji-mu	7013/3337/3077	Uighur
A-pa-yu-fo-hai-ti*	7013/0001/0757/3581/6600/....	Uighur

2/ C. Served as Deputy Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.

3/ Dr Mohammed Mahien. Served as Deputy Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.

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Name	Numeral Code	Nationality
A-tai-erh-ti-pai	0761/1759/3643/6[illegible]/2157	Uighur
A-po-li-tsu-ni-ya-tsu	7093,000/0500/1320/14.1/3663/1320	Uighur
Ma A-erh	2606/0761/0017	Kazakh
- - - -	..../..../....	Kazakh
Ma Liang-chun	7456/3383/7[illegible]	Hui
Chao Yun-lung*	6392/7183/7[illegible]	Hui
Yu-su-fu	3761/3905/3527	Uzbek
Nein Ko-erh* (not legible)	1115/3344/3643	Tatar
- -ti-kun-lu-tsu-ko-erh	0124/..../3660/0060/1133/0761/1320/2[illegible]	Dalek
Han I-man	3063/0132/0[illegible]	Tajik
Ma Kan-erh	6712/1935/3643	Uighur
Yun-tsu-li-ha	6086/3602/0500/0761	Kazakh
Ya-cheng-ho-ta-pai-erh-ti	3060/3[illegible]/0732/1320/2157/3643/4104	Uighur
Kai-i-ta-e-fu	3077/0131/17[illegible]/0761/6059	Uighur
Ma Peng-chi	7456/2455/1015	Dungxiang
Ma Pa-la	7456/.5[illegible]/3157	Hui
Man-sou-shih-sen	..../0[illegible]./0577/0009	Salar
Mai Cheng-chang	6314/2052/4540	Hui
Ma [illegible]-kuei	7456/242[illegible]/7608	Hui
Ma Chen-tung*	7456/21[illegible]2/263[illegible]	Hui

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Name	General Code	Nationality
Chin Peng-shan	6955/7653/1472	Hui
Yang Hung-kuei	3769/3163/1145	Hui
Su Hsieh-lan	5794/1331/3412	Hui
Chou Chien-chih	7486/2896/....	Hui
Lin Ting-hsiang	2651/2013/4372	Hui
Ma Cheng-chai	7760/2502/7072	Hui
Chin Chuan-te	6055/0356/1739	Hui
Yang Te-ming	2709/1765/....	Hui
Ma Yuan-wu*	7456/5663/0063	Hui
Cheng Chu-chien	1734/.991/0913	Hui
Li Chia-yung	2621/13.1/2137	---
Wang Kun-chou	3762/1567/0719	Hui
Ma Pai-sen*	7602/0160/1115	Hui
Kang Chao-chun	5105/1957/3649	Hui
Ma Jun-feng	..../0069/1436	Hui
Li Chen-min	2621/2182/3046	Hui
Tsung Tai-tung	1350/2769/2763	Hui
Tsung Tai-tang*	1350/2769/2763	Hui
Yang Shao-jun	2769/1106/0628	Hui
Yang Shih-chieh	2799/0013/0867	Hui
Li Ching-yu	..../2417/3349	Hui
Yang Te-chun*	2769/1765/2504	Hui
Chen Yu-chi	7115/3786/3083	Hui

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Name	Numeral Code	Nationality
Liu Shao-lung	0491/4801/7093	Hui
Mai Ching-chai	2734/2417/7972	Hui
Ma Hung-yu	7456/7703/3731	Hui
Chu Yueh-po	2612/2588/3134	Hui
Yang Ching-i	3769/4117/0021	Hui
Ma Shih-fen*	7456/0013/5358	Hui
Cheng Lung-hui	6774/7127/1479	Hui
Yang Ming-yuan*	2732/3454/6678	Hui
Yu I	1620/....	Hui
Wang Hsiao-hai*	3769/4607/3395	Hui
Liu Yuan-i	..../0736/0001	Hui
Ma Hung-i	3097/1125/1732	Hui
Yang Shou-liao	3769/2504/.059	Hui
Tao Yieh-chan	1497/6913/1472	Hui
Ma Cheng*	7456/2052	Hui
Li [illegible]-hsuan	..../2429/....	Hui
Yang Ko	3769/0344	Hui
Kan Tao-nan	2231/6470/0018	Hui
Chin Hsiao-tsun	6855/2955/2065	Hui
------	.../..../....	Hui
Ma Shou-lien	7456/..../....	Hui

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APPENDIX B

CHINA HUI CULTURAL ASSOCIATION
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS 1/

Chairman

Liu Ke-ping	0491/2736/1627

Vice-Chairmen

Wang Hsiao-jang	3769/5281/6245	Ha Sung-pin	0702/7703/6333
Ma Teng-ai	7456/7306/7094	Chang Po-chuan	1728/0514/1557
Chao Chung-chi	6392/6945/1140	Pai Chan-t	4101/1109/1744
Ma Sung-ting 2/	7456/2646/0010		

Members

Ting Chen-te	0002/2182/1795	Yu Te-hai	0060/1795/3189
Yu I	1685/0001	Wang Hsu-chiang	3769/5281/1730
Wang Ping-chieh	3769/0393/0204	Wang Lien-fang	3769/0647/5364
Wang Ko	3769/0344	Fang Chu-ju	2455/4554/1172
Ha Yu-lan	1572/3768/1964	Ku Mein-yiang*	0657/6423/5391
Pai Chun-chang	4101/5193/4545	Pai Yen-ling	4101/1693/1604
Pai Feng-hsiang	4101/7609/1511	Tien Ching-Chiang	3944/1777/7230
---lai	..../7191	Shih Yu-hsin*	4258/3769/7209
Wei Chang-wou	4717/7022/5359	Ha Te-kung	0184/3676/0361

1. FBIS Daily Report, 25 May 1953. (An asterisk after a name denotes a woman.)
2. Also known as Hachih Abudureheer.

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Li Hsiao-ying	2621/1331/4154
Yu Ho-en	0151/0395/0776
Li Shu	2621/1659
Chen Hsio-hsi	3088/0667/3556
Wu Yu-tai	0702/1547/3141
Chu Ching-hsiang	5074/2073/4382
Hu Kao-chan	5706/1520/1472
Chin Mo-cheng	6855/7317/3132
Wei Chih-tang	1201/4[illegible]/1016
Ma Hao-i	7456/1335/5030
Ma Peng-te	7456/7685/0356
Ma Chen-hua	7456/2182/5478
Ma Pei-lieh	7456/0012/3525
Ma Hsiao	7456/1381
Ma Yung-chan	7456/3057/4394
Ma Ching-tien	7456/1777/3244
Ma Yu-huai	7456/3766/2849
Ma [illegible]-pen	7456/0523/2600
Ma Yun-wu	7456/6963/0663
Ma Chung-ying*	7456/1813/5391
Ma [illegible]-chih	7456/7506/0046
Ma Feng-wen	7456/6766/5854
Ma Chen-i	7456/7906
Jung Shih-chieh	1327/0013/3154
Yu Tsun-yung	0151/1317/3057
Li Wei-hung	2621/2417/3342
Li Chang-meng	2621/7022/3716
Wu ...-yeh	0702/7703/2814
Hu Hsi-pu	0702/2423/0147
Yu Chao-li	4416/0594/2651
Chin Mou-yao	6855/5300/1471
Pai Jung-hua	2197/5960/5478
Ma Ching-nien	7456/7232/1628
Maluchiwan	7456/0362/0577/5935
Ma Ju-lin	7456/3067/5775
Ma Chih-ang	7456/1307/7122
Ma Chu-hsien*	7456/4554/0513
Ma Lu-wen	7456/6282/2429
Ma Hsu-shih	7456/1311/1365
Ma Lo-ting	7456/2867/0600
Ma Cho-chou	7456/0567/3166
Ma Shu-hsiu*	7456/2873/4423
Ma Kung-chin	7456/0361/3466
Ma Chai-ju	7456/3419/....
Ma Shih-fen	7456/0013/5350
Ma Chien-jen	7456/2067/0086
Chen I-chang*	7086/8034/2420
Ma Cheng-chi	4719/7282/7744

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Hsia Yen-hsuan	1115/2489/6693
Tsao Keng-lin	2580/1135/1732
Chang Hua-tung	1732/3953/2633
Chang Yung-shing	1732/3957/3837
Yang Chih	2792/1492
Yang Tsou-tung*	2792/4371/1746
Yang Hsin	2792/6520
Yang Hsien-chih*	2792/1819/6000
I Chih-chiang*	1332/1507/1739
Liu Kuan-cheng	0491/3562/4545
Liu Shu-ying*	..../3212/5391
Lo Hsueh-chang	4151/1331/1813
Su Pao-chien	5095/2121/2894
Lan Te-keng	5095/1129/6972

Chang Yu-chang	1455/3758/4545
Chang Yu-chen	1732/3768/3791
Chang Yao*	4453/3952
Chao Chao-hao	3306/1421/7729
Yang Chia-chen	2792/4471/1472
Yang Ko-ping	2792/2694/5391
Yang Chao-chun	2792/0340/6074
Chao Chun-lu	6302/1317/1389
Chao Lung-chang	6302/7693/4545
Liu Hsiu-feng	0491/4421/7364
Ma Jui-nan	4476/3543/5392
Man Tao-jen	7281/5673/0026
Su Ping*	5095/0393
Lan Fu-kang	5095/1014/8704

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ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION

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ISLAM IN THE SOVIET UNION

I. The Moslem Peoples

The Soviet Union's 26 million Moslems--roughly 13 per cent of the population 1/--inhabit almost the whole of the southern portion of the country stretching from the shores of the Caspian and Black Seas through Central Asia to the Tatar settlements along the Trans-Siberian railway. Between the Volga and the Urals they have driven a deep wedge into Russian territory, practically separating Russia from Siberia. Along the Trans-Siberian railway they reach Manchuria. With the exception of Armenia and Georgia on the Turkish border, the entire southern frontier--touching Iran, Afghanistan, and Sinkiang--is Moslem.

Politically, six of the 15 Union republics making up the USSR are classed as Moslem: Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In addition, there are the autonomous republics and regions: Bashkir, Daghestan, and Tatar ASSR in the RSFSR; Abkhazia and Adzharia in the Georgian SSR; Nakhichevan in Azerbaidzhan SSR; Kara-Kalpak ASSR in Uzbekistan; and Gorno-Badakhshan in the Tadzhik SSR.

Ethnically the great majority of Soviet Moslems are of Turkish stock, namely, 22,500,000 Turco-Tatars located primarily in Central Asia 2/ and Azerbaidzhan. Turkic languages, spoken in 11 of the Soviet republics, provide five of the official languages of the USSR. Other racial strains include 2,500,000 of Iranian stock in Tadzhikistan and the Caucasus; 500,000 of various Caucasian strains, for example, Kabardin and Adygei; and 400,000 Finno-Ugrians in the Volga region. Finally, there are some 25,000 Arabs in Samarkand, 45,000 Kurds in the Caucasus, and 20,000 Mongols (Tungans) of the Islamic faith in the Altai region.

In matters of faith, Soviet Moslems, like the entire Moslem world itself, are split between the two great rites, Sunni and Shia. The great majority, roughly 23 million, are Sunnites; while over three million are Shiites, found primarily in Azerbaidzhan and other areas of the Caucasus and in Tadzhikistan. In the latter, there are at least 100,000 Ismailis, who owe

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allegiance to the Aga Khan. Shiism, it might be noted, was officially recognized by Tadzhikistan as the fifth approved religious rite 1/ only within the last decade.

II. The Historical Setting

A. The Czarist Conquests

The present Soviet Moslem empire is the result of 400 years of fighting, of the inexorable outward advance of Great Russians from Moscow, from 1552 when the first Moslems were incorporated into the Empire with the conquest of Kazan to the downfall of Czarism. With the establishment of the Soviet regime in 1917 came the demise of the last two khanates of Central Asia. Although the borders of the expanding Russian state moved forward steadily throughout this long period, the major Moslem conquests came only during the nineteenth century.

After the initial conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the Moslems successfully resisted further Russian encroachment, and the Czarist armies shifted their attention to Europe and to Siberia. The assault against Islam was resumed in the eighteenth century when Peter the Great sent his armies against Khiva, only to see them beaten back. By the middle of that century, however, Catherine II had annexed the Kirghiz of the Small Hordes; and by 1783, Russia had annexed the domains of the Crimean Tatar Khan, the independence of which had been provided for in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarji of 1774.

The real beginning of the Russian Moslem conquests can perhaps best be dated from 1803 when the armies of Alexander I conquered the Turkomans of the desolate Mangishlak Peninsula. And as Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Asia gradually moved farther south, until in 1842 the frontier had reached the northern shore of the Aral Sea and in 1847 had been pushed forward to command the lower reaches of the Sir Darya. In 1853 control of the Sir Darya was assumed for a distance of 250 miles from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. These advances sprang from a change in Russian tactics. After an overland expedition failed to capture Khiva in 1839, the march into Turkestan was made by other routes and different methods, primarily by recourse to waterways.

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These years also witnessed a relentless Russian pressure southward on the Caucasus regions. By the time of the Crimean War, the Russian advance here had virtually come to an end. The border with Persia was finalized by the Treaty of Turkomanchai in 1828; while the relatively small areas of Batum, Kars and Ardahan were acquired from Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.

While the Russian advance was steady, it was not without strong opposition, which gave rise to the two great heroes of Soviet Islam. In the Caucasus, the Czarist armies attempting to conquer Daghestan were forced to fight bitterly from 1834 to 1859 against Moslems organized by Shamyl. In Central Asia, Sultan Kenesary Kasymov rallied the Kazakhs from 1837 to 1846, only to fall finally in fratricidal strife with the Kirghis of the Issyk-Kol region.

The conquest of the major portion of Central Asia occurred in the relatively short space of 20 years. The advance began in 1863, and two years later, in 1865, Russian forces under General Chernaiev stormed and captured Tashkent. The emirate of Bokhara was made a protectorate in 1868, after Samarkand had fallen. The Khanate of Kokand was reduced to vassalage in 1866-68, to be finally conquered and annexed in 1875-76. In 1873, Russian columns led by Generals Kaufmann and Skobelev again attacked Khiva, this time successfully, and the Khanate, like that of Bokhara, was made a Russian protectorate. During this same period, Russia advanced into the Transcaspian area, conquering Krasnovodsk in 1869, capturing Geok-Tepe, the Turkoman stronghold, in 1881 after a bloody battle, and subjugating Merv in 1884. This completed the Russian Moslem empire except for subsequent minor border rectifications.

While the Czarist regime oppressed and discriminated against the Moslems in many ways, it showed a remarkable tolerance for Islam. The Kazakhs, for example, were converted from Shamanism to Islam by Moslem religious teachers sent into the steppes by the Czarist government; and although the Czar was the head of the Orthodox Church, the Church was actively discouraged from missionary work in Moslem areas. The natives continued to enjoy tribal self-rule, native courts and laws, general civic rights, and freedom from military service.

This is not to say that no changes were made in the Moslem way of life. The zakat, or religious tax, was abolished in Turkistan; waqif property, formerly tax-free, was taxed;

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pilgrimages to Mecca were forbidden for a time; and a few other measures were taken. Thus, while the Moslem divines lost the dominant position they had enjoyed before the Russian conquest, they were not prosecuted nor did the Czarist government actively interfere in their religious affairs. The Moslem was still free to go to his mosque, observe religious holidays and customs, and practice his religion in peace.

As a result of this policy, there were few revolts against Russian rule. The only serious one was the Andizhan uprising of 1898, which was led by an [redacted] (religious teacher) and had Pan-Islamic overtones. Thereafter, the government kept a more careful watch against Pan-Islamic activity in Turkestan and other Moslem areas, but it took no active measures against Islam as such. On the contrary, it tried to win over the Moslem clergy by making concessions such as the lifting in 1900 of the ban on pilgrimages to Mecca. Serious trouble did not arise again until 1916, when the government attempted to conscript Moslems into the army. A revolt then occurred, in which at least 150,000 Kirghis were killed, while others fled to Sinkiang.

6. The Communist Upheaval

The period from the Bolshevik Revolution until 1924 is one of great confusion. The events of 1917 at first kindled hopes among the Moslems. They not unnaturally desired freedom from their Russian masters, and this desire was increased by the bitterness engendered by the conscription measures and the famine which had followed. They therefore saw no reason not to take advantage of the opportunity created by the Bolshevik Revolution. 4/

The Bolsheviks took pains to win the support and confidence of the Moslems. On 7 December 1917, a proclamation signed by Lenin and Stalin was issued, addressed to "all Moslem toilers of Russia and the East." It read, in part:

> Moslems of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghis and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of the Transcaucasia, Chechens and Mountaineers of the Caucasus--all those whose mosques and prayer-houses have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled under foot by the Czars and the

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oppressors of Russia. Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are free and inviolable. Build your national life freely and unhindered. You have a right to do so.

This proclamation seemed to the Moslems an open invitation to them to declare their independence of Russian rule and to create their own national states, which would be linked to the Russian state only by such economic and other links as they themselves might desire. The Czarist regime was apparently the chief enemy of the Moslems as of the Bolsheviks, so the former were persuaded to cooperate with the latter.

Moslem leaders were at first feasted and feted by the Bolsheviks, but the newly kindled Moslem hopes soon turned to disillusionment as the Bolsheviks, by their actions, showed that their promises of support for Moslem aspirations, as contained in the Lenin-Stalin proclamation, were only a tactical maneuver and that the Reds did not intend to permit any sharing of power. The life of Russia's Moslems, despite all statements to the contrary that might have been made, was to be subjected to Lenin's formula: "National in form, Communist in essence."

Moslem leaders who cooperated with the Bolsheviks while still insisting on Moslem rights were ruthlessly executed or, like the Bashkir leader, Ahmed Zeki Validi (also known then as Ahmed Zeki Velidov and, today, in Turkey, as Ahmed Zeki Validi Togan), were forced to flee. In Bokhara, many Moslem leaders who had cooperated with the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Khan's government (see below) were shot down in the city's principal mosque during Friday prayers by the machine guns of the Moslem traitor Ibrahimov, who was himself later to be executed by the Bolsheviks. In Tashkent, Moslems who ousted officials of the prematurely proclaimed Soviet government soon felt the full weight of Communist armed force which left most of them dead. By 1919, the Moslem Communist Party, which had functioned as an affiliate of the Bolshevik Party, had been suppressed and its leaders liquidated.

The Moslems thus learned by bitter experience the real as contrasted to the declared aims of the Bolsheviks. As a result the Moslem banner was raised in war and some of the worst battles of the revolution were fought on Moslem soil between Red armies and Moslem forces who tried to assert the Moslems' right to determine for themselves their national future.

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The first Moslem efforts to achieve independence--or at least autonomy--occurred in the months following the Kerensky revolution, when various congresses were held at Moscow and Kazan, at which a loose organization was set up. Resolutions were adopted calling for a federalist state with territorial self-rule for each nationality. On 20 November 1917, a commission appointed by the Kazan congress (21 July 1917) convened a National Assembly in Ufa, which elected three ministers--religion, education and finance--to assume responsibility over the three major functions of national-cultural autonomy of Russia's Moslems. By the time the Communists came to power, the Moslems had achieved a measure of unity and of statewide religious and cultural administration. But politically the movement was weak and failed to hang together. The various areas--Crimea, Central Asia, North Caucasus, and Azerbaidzhan--went their own way. Moreover, the Moslems of European Russia did not support their brethren in Asia because they did not want the Czarist domains broken up into a number of separate states. They advocated instead a unitary Russia as a single political entity governed from Moscow within which they envisaged themselves as occupying positions of great influence.

In Central Asia the Moslems proclaimed three independent states, the first at Kokand, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazakh territory, and the third in Bashkir country. All proved ephemeral. The state of Kokand lasted only two months, falling to a Bolshevik assault in February 1918. Alash Orda can never more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. The Bashkir state fell soon after Kokand, revived shortly, only to be finally crushed in 1919.

The semi-independent khanates of Bokhara and Khiva were also the scene of turmoil. There, liberal elements among the Moslems revolted against the despotic rule of the Khans and, with Soviet help, gained control of the governments. People's Soviet Republics, rather than Socialist Soviet Republics, were set up in Bokhara and Khorezm (i.e., Khiva) in 1920, and agreements regulating the relations of these states with Russia were signed with the Bolsheviks. This arrangement ended in 1924 when the Soviets stripped away this facade and incorporated the area of the two states as integral parts of the Soviet Union.

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Although the Khans had been driven from their thrones, they were not entirely without supporters. Nationalist elements united with feudal beys and mullahs to form the Basmachi movement, with which the name of Enver Pasha is associated, that rallied the people against the Russians for many years. The Basmachis controlled important areas up to 1922 and continued strong resistance as late as 1926 when their leader, Ibrahim Bek, was forced to flee across the border into Afghanistan. In 1931 he recrossed the border to raid but was captured and executed. Thus, it might be said that the Soviet pacification of Central Asia did not end until that year.

Similar events can also be adduced for Crimea and the Caucasus regions. There, too, Moslems, as well as Armenians and Georgians, undertook to establish independent states, which, like their counterparts in Central Asia, were ruthlessly crushed by Communist forces.

In Central Asia the political boundaries were not stabilized until 1936. The former Czarist provinces of Turkestan and the Steppe were initially included in the RSFSR as autonomous republics, while the former Khanates of Bokhara and Khiva became the People's Soviet Republics of Bokhara and Khorezm. The latter two entities came to an end in September 1924. In May 1925, these areas, together with most of old Turkestan, became the SSRs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, with Tadzhikistan forming an ASSR within Uzbekistan. By 1926 the remainder of old Turkestan had been combined with the old Steppe Provinces to form the ASSR of Kazakhstan within the RSFSR, as well as the Kirghizia ASSR. Tadzhikistan was given full republic status in 1929. The final rearrangement of borders occurred in 1936, when Kazakhstan and Kirghizia also were both raised to republic status.

III. Soviet Moslems in World War II

The Moslem areas have been the object of constant pressure and persecution since the establishment of the Communist regime, and of never-ending attempts to discredit Islam and to replace it with the atheistic tenets of Communism. The reason is not hard to find: the Kremlin leaders have never felt that they could trust their Moslem subjects.

This statement is particularly evident in the military field. In the early years of the USSR, national units were to be found in the Red Army. In 1938, however, the Kremlin ordered the

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Commissar of National Defense, Marshal Voroshilov, to dissolve the All-Moslem regiments and send the men into other units. Since that time Moslem conscripts have been scattered throughout the army so that there will be no solid block of Moslems which might form a focus for revolt. 5/ Moreover, the number of Moslem officers has always been far less than could be expected on the basis of their numbers; very few Moslems have ever achieved general rank. The British writer, Mark Alexander, reports that even at the end of the war, there was only one Central Asiatic native who held a rank above that of lieutenant colonel. 6/

During the war, the Soviet Moslems were a prime target for German propaganda. The former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, for example, broadcast from Berlin appeals to the faithful to rise up against the Soviet regime. In 1942 a number of insurrections are reported to have flared up in Central Asia. To counter this threat, the Kremlin found it expedient to make numerous concessions to the Moslems in a bid for their unreserved support. To an extent, these measures seemed to have been successful. In 1942, a conference of Moslem divines and laymen was convened in Ufa to discuss Moslem participation in the war, and a resolution was adopted, copies of which were distributed by the thousands in Tatar, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tadzhik, calling on the faithful to pray to Allah for a Russian victory and to contribute money, clothing and valuables for the war effort. The appeal resulted in the collection of more than five million rubles, including 50,000 from the Mufti of Ufa; while the Moslems of the Bashkir ASSR sent many gifts to the Bashkir Division led by General Mingalaya Shaimuratov, the only Bashkir general officer.

Altogether, more than a million Moslems served in the Red Army during the war, many of them gallantly. Tadzhik and Uzbek units were prominent in the fighting at Stalingrad under Siberian General Rodimtsev. The final assault on Velikiy Luki on New Year's Day, 1943, was delivered by divisions which included Uzbeks and Kazakhs.

Nevertheless, the war also proved that the Kremlin's distrust of the Moslems was not entirely misplaced. In the first year of the fighting, more than half a million Moslem soldiers were captured or deserted, while many of the Moslems in the Crimea and the Caucasus hailed the Germans as liberators and gave them help. Had German policies as regards treatment of

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Soviet Moslems been more enlightened, undoubtedly even greater help would have been forthcoming from them.

Eventually, more than 130,000 Moslems volunteered to serve in German units. The larger part--about 100,000--were placed in labor, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but others served in combat units of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS. The greater part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was composed of these volunteers, and the Wehrmacht also included 19 independent battalions and 24 infantry companies in which the rank and file were composed solely of Turks and Tadzhiks from east of the Caspian. In the Waffen-SS, there was a formation known as Ostturkischer Waffenverband (East Turkish armed formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. The regiments were composed respectively of men from Turkistan, Azerbaidzhan, the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea.

Despite the ill-advised German policies which resulted in discriminatory and often humiliating treatment, the Moslems fought heroically against their former masters. At Stalingrad, three battalions of Turkistanis fought to the last man, while others were destroyed in fighting in the Caucasus. At the end of the war, six battalions held up the Russian advance in front of Berlin for a time. In all these volunteers suffered 50,000 killed and 12,000 war disablements--an impressive record considering their relatively small numbers.

Communist retribution for this treason by Moslems was swift and harsh, with several Moslem peoples being eliminated from Soviet life. On 25 June 1946, the Kremlin revealed that the Crimean Tatar and Chechen-Ingush ASSRs had been dissolved because of the aid rendered to the Germans by many of their members and the failure of others to offer opposition to such aid. The 25 June decree was merely the formal legalization of a fait accompli, for even while the war was still in progress the entirety of these peoples had been deported to unknown destinations in the east. The Crimean Tatars had, in fact, declared a gazavat (holy war) against the Soviets and had risen in revolt, which the Communist forces had put down. Deportations followed, and as a further precautionary measure, all members of Tatar groups living on the Black Sea coast, in the Ukraine and White Russia, and in other areas of the war zone had been evacuated. The Chechen-Ingush people had been removed en masse during the war to protect the Grozny oil region.

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The Balkar people also suffered extinction. The Kabardino-Balkar ASSR became simply the Kabardyno ASSR on 8 March 1944, and the Karachayev autonomous region was eliminated about the same time. The Ingushetian ASSR was reduced in size, with territory north of the Terek River being transferred to the newly created Grozny Region. It might be mentioned that Moslems were not the only ones to be subjected to extermination, for the Kalmyk ASSR, a Buddhist region, was also dissolved and its inhabitants deported.

These measures were true instances of genocide, for the peoples involved, previously national and cultural entities, were scattered in the vast eastern wastes of the Soviet Union, their ancient homelands occupied by Slavic settlers. The very words Crimean Tatar, Chechen, Ingush and Balkar were removed from encyclopedias, atlases, history books and dictionaries. Their exact fate remains a mystery, for the Kremlin has never announced any details.

In only one case has any clue to their fate become known. In May 1955, the Alma-Ata newspaper Kazakhstanskaya Pravda published an announcement relative to the opening later that year of a Chechen-language weekly newspaper to be called Kirkinshilik Zhanazh (Banner of Labor). On 25 August 1955, the Kazakhstan Society for the Propagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge revealed that it had arranged lectures on atheism in the Chechen language at Taldy. Kazakhstan newspapers reported on 7 September that the Komsomol committee in Akmolinsk had organized a Chechen-Ingush song and dance troupe. It thus appears that these persecuted peoples were resettled in various parts of Kazakhstan.

These revelations present several interesting aspects. It is surprising, first of all, that these distrusted and allegedly traitorous Moslems should have been settled in another Moslem area, and, secondly, that they should have been relocated in groups sufficiently large to retain their identity and to warrant a newspaper in their own language. That their national--or at least cultural--existence had once again been recognized, can probably be attributed to the relaxation of Soviet policy which has occurred since Stalin's death and to the Kremlin's attempts to woo the Moslem World. This is further borne out by the recently published text of party chief Khrushchev's speech to the party congress in February 1956 attacking Stalin, in which Khrushchev characterized the obliteration of the Moslem political entities as completely unwarranted and unnecessary.

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IV. The Moslem Religion Under the Soviets

A. The 1918-1941 Period

Throughout the period when the Bolsheviks were trying to establish their control over the Moslem areas during the civil war, they made frequent appeals for Moslem support and promises of no religious interference. Immediately upon achieving victory, however, the Communists revealed their true nature and repressive acts began. While the Constitution provides for freedom of both religion and anti-religious propaganda, events soon showed that propagandists of atheism had the support of both state and party, while religious leaders had the support only of a weak church, Christian or Moslem. The League of Militant Godless, later known as the League of Militant Atheists, waged a vigorous campaign designed to ridicule Islam and all other religions.

Initially no direct attack was made on Islam by the Soviet state, though a number of restrictions was imposed. As early as 1918, the teaching of religion in the schools was prohibited, as was religious instruction outside the schools to groups of children larger than three in number. Lands belonging to mosques and sacred vessels were confiscated by a decree of 23 January 1918, which provided for the secularization of waqifs. During the period 1921-1922, the state abolished and banned Moslem religious brotherhoods. A campaign was also undertaken to undermine the influence of Moslem divines by emphasizing their alleged lack of education, unfitness and unearned riches.

In 1928 the Communist tactics were changed and a direct attack on the Moslem faith was launched, which included measures that made active religious life virtually impossible. Islamic leadership was physically destroyed through the arrest and deportation of almost all persons enjoying some religious status, from the top hierarchy down to the lowest village mullah; nearly all village mosques and most city mosques were closed; religious literature was suppressed through the changing of alphabets, the impounding of religious texts, including the Koran, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature; and economic pressure was exerted by threatening dismissal of anyone in a responsible position if known to engage in religious practices. These measures were ostensibly justified by a series of trials at Tashkent, which brought to light alleged

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Pan-Islamic tendencies among the Moslem peoples.

Moslem mosques during this period were confiscated wholesale and converted into warehouses and stores or closed and allowed to crumble into ruins. The Soviets themselves later admitted that while there were 7,000 mosques in European Russia alone in 1917, there were, in 1942, only 1,312 in the whole of the Soviet Union. Although some new mosques have been built since 1942 and others repaired, the situation has not greatly improved. In Tashkent, for example, there were 300 mosques when the Communists came to power. Today there are only 20, mostly small and dilapidated and not in use. Samarkand, which once had over 400, has today only 17, of which only one is being used. Bokhara, which once boasted of 360, today has only one; and its famed Kalyan Mosque, once the pride of Central Asia, is little more than a ruin. Alma-Ata, a Moslem town for centuries and the capital of the Moslem republic of Kazakhstan, has not a single mosque; nor are any to be found in such large Moslem centers as Kuibyshev (180,000), Ashkhabad (200,000) or Stalinabad (300,000). The single mosque in Leningrad has been closed, while the one mosque in Moscow which is still open is located in a poor section of town and is not well attended.

The madrassahs, or religious schools, have suffered the same fate as the mosques. It is estimated that at least 5,000 have disappeared during the Communist regime. The 101 madrassahs that once existed in Bokhara used to train 16,000 mullahs annually. Today there is only one, which is, in fact, the only one remaining in the entire Soviet Union. According to its vice-director, Hasan Sadek, the school has only 105 students, who follow a nine-year course. And there are only three Soviet citizens studying Islam abroad, at Cairo's al-Azhar University.

Having liquidated the Islamic leadership in the 1928-1932 period and now permitting only this minute number of new religious leaders to be trained, the Kremlin seems effectively to be stifling Islam at the roots. Inevitably Islam will wither as a result of this deprivation of its mosques and prayer-houses and of trained clerics to serve as imams, khatibs, cantors, ulema, muftis, notaries and teachers. In the future the situation will probably become worse. At present there still exist some mullahs who managed to escape the terror of 1928-1932. Post-war refugees from Central Asia have reported

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that these "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers, but when the occasion arose conducted religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. But they are comparatively few in number and live under constant threat of exposure and arrest. They cannot, therefore, make a great impression on the religious life of their communities.

During this era of repression the Kremlin also took steps to isolate Soviet Moslems from their co-religionists abroad. Pilgrimages to Mecca were prohibited. While Soviet Moslems were allowed to attend the All-Moslem Conference in Mecca in 1926, none was permitted to attend the congress held in Jerusalem in 1931. All contact with the Moslem world ceased until the exigencies of the war induced the Communist leaders to relax their attitude.

5. The Wartime Concessions

In 1941 the hard-pressed Soviet government sought to win over as many supporters as possible and to this end stressed loyalty to the fatherland in place of loyalty to the party, which had previously been the official line. As part of the campaign, concessions were made to many groups, including religious groups, in exchange for their support of the regime and the war effort. While the ban on religious proselytizing was not lifted, Soviet officials were ordered to cease anti-religious propaganda and the liquidation of churches and mosques.

The ban on pilgrimages to Mecca was lifted in 1944, and selected groups of Moslems made the hajj in 1945 and 1946; while Caucasian Shiite groups visited Shiite shrines in Tabriz, Mianeh, Qazvin and Resht, under the leadership of the Shaykh-ul-Islam of Baku. The Koran was again permitted to be printed. The government in 1944 also authorized the construction of 10 new mosques and the repair of others, and approved plans for the construction of many others in the principal Moslem cities. It is claimed that this resulted in the number of mosques rising from the 1942 low of 1,312 to 1,500 by 1947. Another wartime decree authorized any group of believers of more than 20 adults to form a religious association or congregation. This decree would seem to sanction the reappearance of Moslem religious brotherhoods, but there is no evidence that any Moslems have dared to test the Kremlin's good faith in this respect.

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As a further move to regularize state relations with the Moslem faith, the government in 1944 established a State Council of Religious Cults to extend aid to mosques and to facilitate Moslem religious congresses at which new spiritual leadership would be elected. The first Moslem congress under the wartime dispensations had convened on 15 May 1942 at Ufa, capital of the Bashkir ASSR and traditional center of Islam in European Russia, at which a Moslem Administrative Council (or Spiritual Directorate) for European Russia and Siberia was organized, with Abdurrahman Rasulev as mufti. 1/ The new Moslem spiritual hierarchy was completed by the organization of three similar councils during the next two years: at Tashkent on 15 October 1943, for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, with Ishan Babakhan Ibn Abdulmedjid-Khan Ogly as mufti; at Baku on 28 May 1944, for Transcaucasia, with Shaykh-ul-Islam Ali-Zade Akhund-Aga as mufti; 2/ and at Buinaksk on 20 July 1944, for North Caucasus, with Sheikh-Zadi Gebekov as mufti. 3/ The work of these four councils is coordinated by the Central Council of Moslem Religious Centers of the USSR, which the Mufti of the Muftis (i.e., of Ufa) heads.

The formation of these councils gave Moslems no real autonomy or freedom of action. The councils were--and are--subordinated to Moscow and are, in fact, agencies of the government. In return for this facade of autonomy, as in the case of the concessions granted to the Orthodox Church, the regime required from Moslem religious leaders active support as regards the war and praise of its religious policies. For example, the Mufti of Transcaucasia was quoted on 11 October 1944 as declaring that "the Moslems of Russia were never so free in matters of religion as under Soviet power." In more recent years, representatives of these councils have regularly appeared at peace congresses and similar Communist meetings, at which they dutifully voiced praise of the Soviet regime and support of its policies both domestic and foreign. An example is the "Conference of All Churches and Religious Associations of the USSR for the Defense of World Peace," which met at Zagorsk on 9-12 May 1952. 4/

It should be noted that the administrative councils and their work are seldom mentioned in the Soviet press, so that many Soviet Moslems are probably unaware of their existence.

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C. Post-War Soviet Policies

The end of the war soon brought indications of how transitory were these concessions granted to Moslems. Permission for Moslems to make the pilgrimage was withdrawn in 1947 on grounds of an alleged outbreak of cholera in Egypt. At the same time the tone of the Soviet press towards Islam hardened as the regime prepared to intensify its attacks on religion. An article in Turkmenskaya Iskra on 25 May 1948 stated:

> The religious leadership is trying with all its might and ability to support the old order for the purpose of maintaining faith in the immovability of Islam among the people, and therefore an active struggle with religious prejudices is needed.
>
> It must be admitted that during recent years some Party organizations have slackened the struggle against that narcotic, religion....

The attacks became more blatant after July 1950 when newspapers published a detailed statement by Bagirov, First Secretary of the Azerbaidzhan CP, in which he declared that Mohammed was "a representative of the feudal-mercantile aristocracy who utilized Islam for the unification of the Arab tribes and for the maintenance of their own power."

Anti-religious propaganda has been increased on all fronts. In 1949, an anti-religion museum was opened in Tashkent for the first time. After the Communist press began to denounce the small number of anti-religious lectures being delivered--only 20 in Tashkent in the first half of 1950--they increased in number throughout the Moslem areas. A concentrated attack also was launched against Moslem religious holidays. A decree of 3 August 1950 abolished Friday, the traditional Moslem day of prayer, as the weekly day of rest in Kazakhistan. In the rest of Central Asia Sunday had been the weekly rest day since the 1930's.

The campaign against Islam today is more difficult than in the early days of the Soviet regime, because Islam has adapted itself to new conditions and functions on a voluntary basis. Since atheism is today state policy, a Moslem is not under any social pressure to conform to Islamic customs and religious

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requirements; in fact there are definite political and economic advantages in not doing so. Consequently observance of Islamic patterns is strictly a voluntary matter. Since the Communists have by now largely eliminated the Moslem clergy, while the activities of those remaining are severely curtailed and restricted, the original theme of "exploitation by the clergy" is no longer valid.

Soviet propaganda is now based primarily on materialistic considerations, which are thought to be more effective than the former pseudo-scientific lectures. Radio, press and other propaganda media stress the irreconcilability of Communism and Islam and ridicule the observance of Moslem practices. They stress the defects of the faith and express indignation over the loss of time resulting from religious observances or prayer. A particular point of attack is the observance of fasting, with emphasis on its dangers to health.

In addition to the above measures a number of laws exist with provisions directed against the Islamic faith. The Criminal Codes of the Uzbek, Tadzhik and Turkmen SSR's, as well as that of the RSFSR which is also enforced in the Kirghiz and Kazakh SSR's, provide varying penalties for the practice of a wide number of religious acts. Thus the compulsory collection of church tithes, religious instruction of minors in state or private schools, and the performance of religious rites in public and state institutions are specifically prohibited. Other statutes deal with the "illegal assumption by religious organizations of functions which are exercised by public bodies" and the "commission of deceitful actions with the intent of arousing superstition in the masses." The vague formulation of these statutes makes them susceptible of wide application. Article 136 of the Uzbek Criminal Code even goes so far as to provide the death penalty for "the use of religious prejudices for counterrevolutionary purposes."

The campaign against Islam suffers from two disabilities. In the anti-religious propaganda, fundamentals of Islam are incorrectly described, attacked and refuted. Islam is alleged to be pro-capitalistic, anachronistic and primitive. But these attacks are generally aimed at the behest of the Russians by Soviet Moslems; and according to Shir Mohammed Khanov, a Central Asian who escaped from the USSR in 1952, by making their accusations ridiculous in the extreme, these supposed

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Communists produce a decisive reaction from Moslem readers. 11/

A second obstacle is the tenacity with which most Moslems cling to their old ways and customs. Cases of polygamy and child marriage, forbidden by Soviet law, are constantly being exposed, even among Communist Party members. The same holds true of the custom of kalym (bride purchase). Women who still cling to the veil are to be found in the large cities as in rural areas. And if Soviet Moslems cannot make the hajj to Mecca, there are still an abundance of shrines within the Soviet Union itself which can be visited. On 24 May 1956, for example, Turkestanskaya Pravda reported with disgust that "Kazakh members of the Academy of Sciences in Alma-Ata had gone to the tomb of a saint and had signed the visitors' book.

While this struggle against Islam has persisted, the Soviets have tried carefully to give the impression abroad of complete freedom for Moslems in the USSR. Moslem leaders of other countries are invited to the Soviet Union and carefully guided around so as to see and hear only what the Soviets want them to witness. But even this careful itinerary cannot show the visitors mosques and madrassahs that do not exist, as shown, for example, by a series of articles in the Karachi newspaper Dawn 12/ written by Dr. Riaz Ali Shah, a tuberculosis specialist, who toured the Moslem areas of the USSR. Although small selected groups of Moslems have again been permitted to make the hajj since Stalin's death, non-Soviet Moslems generally realize that the pilgrims are making the hajj more for political purposes than for religious devotion. The failure of the Soviet to permit its citizens to attend such meetings as the World Moslem Congresses which have been held in Karachi in recent years has further strengthened the realization of the Moslem world that despite all claims to the contrary, Soviet Moslems are not free.

2. The Present Status of Islam

The Koran makes incumbent upon every true believer observance of the five Pillars of the Faith: profession of the faith, prayer, alms giving, fasting and pilgrimage. An examination of the extent to which these are, and can be, observed today in the Soviet Union shows how difficult it is for a Moslem really to be true to his religious obligations.

Only the profession of the faith can be made without hindrance. Prayer, the next most important Pillar, seems to have

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declined to such an extent as to have all but vanished. The main reason for this is the Soviet Moslem's inability to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers. Communal worship is also precluded because Friday is now a regular working day. The only times when a Moslem may perform his prayers undisturbed are at sunrise and sunset--the first and last of the prescribed daily prayers--when he is at home. The younger generation, having generally been deprived of religious instruction, is further handicapped by its ignorance of the prayers.

Fasting during the month of Ramadan is virtually impossible. To eliminate or even reduce daytime work for a whole month is inconceivable in a society in which almost every worker is an employee of a state which drives relentlessly to increase production. Moreover, a worker who fasts all day is, even when compelled to do a full day's work, a poor worker. As a result the Ramadan fast is severely repressed by the authorities and can survive only in a greatly modified form. Soviet Moslems are frequently subjected to tests if suspected of observing the fast. For example, they may be called in for conference by their superiors sometime during the month of Ramadan and there offered a drink or cigarette. Refusal to accept the offer is tantamount to an admission of fasting and may well lead to dismissal.

Alms giving, known as zakat and traditionally set at 2.5 per cent of earnings, has completely disappeared. In Central Asia this had never had deep religious significance but was used as a type of tax for the benefit of local authorities. It had virtually vanished even before the Communists came to power as a result of Czarist efforts to suppress it. Post-war refugees from Central Asia report that even the word zakat is generally unknown in that area today.

The hajj was banned until 1944. After being permitted for several years as a result of wartime concessions, it was again prohibited in 1947, to be again authorized after Stalin's death. Even now, however, the hajj is effectively prohibited to the ordinary devout Soviet Moslem, for such pilgrims as are allowed to make the trip are carefully chosen from among persons regarded as reliable by the Communist Party--and no truly religious person would fall into this category. Of the five Pillars four have either vanished or are observed rarely and imperfectly.

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The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings and burials have to a large extent lost their religious character because of the shortage of mullahs and other Moslem clerics. On occasion a family may use one of the "hidden mullahs," but natives are more apt to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk the danger of the other procedure.

As for the shariat--the Islamic religious law system--this has been eliminated entirely by the Soviet liquidation of native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice throughout the Soviet Union. Here, as in the case of Islam itself, is a record of solemn promises lightly broken. Speaking to the Daghestanis on 13 November 1920, Stalin declared:

> It has come to our attention that enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumors that the Soviet Government forbids the Shariat. Here, in the name of the Government of the RSFSR, I have the authority to declare that these rumors are untrue. The Government of Russia reserves to each people the full right to be governed by its own laws and customs. The Soviet Government considers the Shariat the same kind of authoritative customary law as that of the other peoples inhabiting Russia. If the Daghestani people desires to preserve its own laws and customs, then they shall be preserved.

The periodical Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo (Soviet State and Law) for January 1940 did not hesitate to write, however, that:

> Stalinist precepts, when carried out, quickly led to the elimination of the old-fashioned beliefs in the usefulness of the Shariat, and before long, when the workers themselves were in practice convinced of the advantages and the true popular character of Soviet law, the Shariat eliminated itself and was liquidated.

Komsomol'skaya Pravda, on 12 July 1951, described the Shariat as "a collection of laws which are among the most ignoble and unjust in the world"; while the Soviet Political Dictionary states flatly that in the USSR, now, the Shariat is eradicated.

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V. Colonization of Moslem Areas

The Soviets make much of the claim that in the USSR every distinct nationality and culture is not only permitted but encouraged to develop along its own lines. In reality, a constant Russification of the Moslem areas has been pushed systematically, so that it is not impossible that there may eventually be no areas of the USSR which can properly be designated as Moslem. The total Moslem area has already been reduced by the settlement of Slavs in the ancient homelands of the Crimean Tatars, Chechen-Ingush, Balkars, etc.

More important than the effects of these genocidal measures is the policy of mass settlement of Great Russians, Ukrainians and White Russians in Moslem areas, which slowly reduces the Moslem majorities in those areas and will eventually push them into the minority.

This policy is a continuation of one pursued by the Tsarist regime. In 1897, the population of the Moslem areas was 90 per cent native. Since then this percentage has steadily dropped. The first wave of immigration occurred between 1906 and 1911 when roughly one million Slavs were settled in Moslem territory. The second was during and after the collectivization period, 1928-1932, which saw the settlement of more than 1,650,000 non-Moslems. During World War II the Moslem regions--rich in natural resources and removed from the war zone--were subjected to a vast industrialization program, for which workers were brought in. In addition, large numbers of persons estimated as high as 10 million were evacuated to Central Asia from European Russia, many of whom remained. More recently the Kremlin has been encouraging young men and women to go to the sparsely settled areas of Central Asia to open up new areas for agriculture, especially cereal grains.

Aside from the deliberate policy of encouraged immigration, other factors have worked to decrease the ratio of natives to Europeans. Collectivization was strongly resisted by Moslem peasants and had to be enforced by harsh methods. How many Moslems perished as a result or fled to Sinkiang (as many Kazakhs and Kirghiz are said to have done) is not known. Nevertheless, according to the Soviets' own figures, the Kazakh population, for example, fell between 1926 and 1939 by 21.3 per cent when, by normal expectation, it should have increased by 15.6 per cent. Thus, in 13 years, one out of every three Kazakhs perished.

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Soviet industrialization has also produced great demographic changes. Even in Tsarist days, such industry as existed in Moslem areas was in Russian hands. Under the Soviets, every new factory has meant the influx of more Europeans, to build and manage the plants and, in many cases, to operate them. At the same time that Europeans were arriving in Moslem areas, Moslems were being transferred to other parts of the Soviet Union to serve as unskilled or semi-skilled laborers. It has been estimated, for example, that at least 10 per cent of the Kazakhs and Kirghis in the USSR do not live in their respective republics of Kazakhstan and Kirghizia.

As a result of all these factors, the European population of the Moslem areas—this applies to the Caucasus areas as well as to Central Asia—has increased to where it numbers at least one-fourth of the total and, in many cities and industrial centers, constitutes a majority. In Kazakhstan, for example, the Kazakhs are still the largest single element but are actually slightly less than half of the total population of the republic. In Kirghizia, the Kirghis have fallen from more than 66 2/3 per cent in 1926 to only 50 per cent on the eve of World War II. The Uzbeks provided 76 per cent of the population in Uzbekistan in 1933 and Russians only 5.6 per cent. But the population of the republic has increased greatly since then and most of the newcomers are European. Today the respective percentages are estimated at 62.25 and 20.75 respectively. Natives formed 77.9 per cent of Turkmenistan's population in 1926 as against 9.8 per cent for Russians. By 1947, the percentages were 65.3 natives, 22.2 Russian, and 12 Ukrainians. Tadzhikistan has been less affected, but here too the percentage of Russians has increased significantly. The same is true for the Caucasus regions, where Europeans have flocked to work in the oil fields and other industrial projects.

While the Moslems are losing their numerical majorities in their homelands, their ethnic identity does not appear to be in any immediate danger. European immigrants settle side by side with the natives rather than among them. The immigrants form their own villages where they go their own way, while the natives also live apart. In the cities, Europeans tend to develop their own quarters or to erect new towns. Even collectivized farms are generally native or European, although the former may employ some Russians as doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, etc., while native sheepherders or laborers may be employed on European kolkhozy.

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Social contact, too, is limited. Europeans and Moslems may come into contact necessarily in their work, but this contact ceases after working hours. In the universities, technical schools, etc., where work is combined with residence, Moslems and Russians tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. When given the choice, students prefer to live in separate communities.

Intermarriage, by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers, is virtually non-existent. This is due to the cultural gap between the two groups, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the control of Moslem parents over their children--Moslem marriages are still generally arranged; and the difficulties a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Russian or Moslem community. For religious reasons, no Moslem family would, under any conditions, permit a Moslem girl to marry a Russian boy; and should a girl do so in defiance of parental disapproval, her male relatives would seek to kill her. 11/ Some marriages occur between Moslem males and Russian women because of the shortage of Moslem girls, but even such cases are rare. Intermarriage insofar as it exists at all is confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Moslem areas to take up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

VI. Political Control

The various constituent republics of the USSR are theoretically independent and free to secede if they so desire, but any republic so foolish as to attempt to invoke this right would immediately be chastised. Each republic sends deputies to the All-Union Soviet in Moscow, and each has its own cabinet, parliament and other manifestations of separate government. Areas of activity left to the republics, however, are small indeed, and most republic cabinet ministers are responsible to their All-Union counterparts in Moscow.

In theory the proportion of natives and Russians cadres at all levels of Soviets, administration and Party in each republic are supposed to correspond to the numerical importance of the different peoples of the total population, but this condition

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is almost never observed. Russians are disproportionately well represented in the leading positions of the various republic governments and legislatures. Most republic ministries are headed by natives, but the latter always have Russian, or at least non-Moslem, deputies, and in all cases Russians serve as Ministers of State Security and of Internal Affairs. More than 50 per cent of the local representatives of these ministries are non-Moslem, being Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian and even Jewish. Europeans also maintain firm control of state banking, economic planning and the public prosecutor offices.

Control is also assured through the Communist Party, which approves persons to fill elective offices and appointive positions. The Central Committee of the CP of each republic has three secretaries. The second secretary is usually a Russian, leaving the position of first secretary for a local native figurehead. Russians occupy leading positions on lower party levels, their number usually far outweighing their representation in the population of the respective republics. The subservience to Moscow of all party organizations makes it impossible for natives ever to capture party control from Russian leadership. Russian control is assured by the fact that natives are never allowed to outnumber Russians in the party membership.

The extent of Russian predominance in positions of authority can be shown graphically by the following figures:

Kazakh SSR: Figures published by Narodnoye Khozyaystvo Frunze on 13 August 1954 show that at that time in the Kazakh ministries Kazakhs held only 2 per cent of the administrative posts in local industry and public health, 4 per cent in light industry, 6.7 per cent in textiles, 10 per cent in agriculture, and 14 per cent in meat and dairy industries. The cabinet formed in May 1951 included 25 Moslem and 12 Russian ministers. Kazakhs provided only 63 per cent of the delegates to the 5th (December 1951) Kazakh CP congress and 61 per cent to the 6th (September 1952) congress. Three of five party secretaries are Russian, and the latter also hold all key posts in the Komsomol organization. The city soviet of Alma-Ata, elected in March 1953, comprised 74 per cent Russians and only 26 per cent natives.

Kirghiz SSR: Although Moslems form roughly two-thirds of the population, they occupied in 1954 only 17.8 per cent of

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all leading industrial posts in the republic and 27 per cent in planning, finance and trade organs. In the government, there were only several Kirghiz in the Ministry of Finance as against several hundred Russians; and not a single Kirghiz in the commerce directorates for the regions of Osh, Issyk-Kul, Djalalabad and Frunze. Less than 10 per cent of the employees of the State Bank of Kirghizia are natives. The cabinet organized in May 1951 comprised seven Russians and 21 Moslems. Of the 302 deputies elected to the Frunze city Soviet in March 1953, only 82 (27 per cent) were Kirghiz, while the remainder were Russian.

Uzbek SSR: In March 1954, the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP comprised 57 Moslems as against 26 non-Moslems, although Uzbeks form at least 62.25 per cent of the population. The committee elected by the 11th congress in September 1952 included 39 per cent Russians. The Supreme Soviet of the republic, elected in February 1951, had 106 non-Moslem deputies, or 25 per cent; but the percentages were higher among those coming from industrial regions: Frunze, 43.3; Namangan, 25.5 and Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 30.

Tadzhikistan SSR: The cabinet formed in March 1951 included 10 Russians and 10 Tadzhiks, although Europeans still constitute but a small part of the population. The 8th congress of the Tadzhik CP in September 1952 included 43 per cent non-Moslems.

Turkmen SSR: In 1926 Russians constituted only 5.6 per cent of the members of the republic's Supreme Soviet, but by 1947 this percentage had risen to 22.2. In June 1945, Moslems provided only five per cent of the delegates to the 17th congress of the CP in the city of Ashkabad.

Although similar figures and percentages are not available for the Moslem areas of the Caucasus regions and of European Russia, the same Russian predominance in government is known to exist there.

This firm hold on the political life of the Moslems is also revealed in the absence of Moslems from high national posts either in the party or in the government. No Moslem has ever been a member of the central Soviet cabinet or of the Politburo, and only one, Bagirov of Azerbaidzhan--a nominal Moslem but actually an avowed atheist--has ever received the status of candidate member. In fact, few Moslems have ever received

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all-Union stature in any field. One, a Kirghiz named Tarai Ryskulov, was Stalin's deputy as People's Commissar of Nationalities in the early days of the regime and later became vice-premier of the RSFSR, only to disappear in the 1937 purge. Begirov, it might be noted, has only recently (May 1956) been executed as an alleged tool of Beria.

The Moslem desire for independence has not yet been completely eradicated by the Soviets, who have had to struggle constantly against the twin evils of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism. In 1923 the Tatar leader, Sultan Galiev, was executed after the so-called Pan-Turanian trials on charges that he fomented an anti-Soviet conspiracy among the Soviet Turkish peoples. At the end of 1933, the purge of the leading officials of Tadzhikistan and the replacement of the entire leadership of the Tadzhik CP was motivated by the charge that they were following a national Tadzhik rather than a Communist line. Also in the 1930's, a secret organization Turkmen Azatlygi (Turkmen Independence) was uncovered. Earlier, in 1926, a gifted young Moslem poet named Mehmed Mehmud Bey was arrested as being the leader of a secret organization Milli Istiklal (National Independence). The Soviets have, in fact, deemed it expedient to prohibit the use of the word Moslem or Turk to describe a Soviet citizen.

Despite all of the Kremlin's efforts nationalist feelings continue to exist. Moslems, having had undeniable educational benefits under the Soviet regime and many of them having had military service outside the USSR, have become somewhat more inclined to think for themselves. Moslem sympathy has also been estranged by the fate of the Crimeans, Chechens and others. Moreover, the rise of nationalism among Moslems outside the Soviet Union, often under Communist instigation, has given impetus to nationalist feelings among Soviet Moslems. Communist control in the USSR is such that little effect can be expected from these internal developments; yet they pose a potential threat to the Soviet system.

Outside the USSR Soviet Moslem refugees have formed numerous organizations and committees to carry on a propaganda campaign in favor of eventual liberation of their enslaved homelands. The work of these organizations is unimportant in itself, but it indicates the temper of Soviet Moslems who have managed to escape, and it seems not improbable that the same sentiments are latent in those still under Soviet control.

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How many Soviet Moslem refugees there are is not known. Veli Kajum Khan, president of the Turkistan Unity Committee, claims that there are nearly three million. Merle Fainsod, writing in the American Political Science Review, states that there are about 450,000. 18/ Regardless of their number, their efforts are even less effective than might be the case, because of personal antagonisms and internal disagreements. Some of the organizations look forward to a single independent Moslem state, others to separate national states, and still others merely to national autonomy within a non-Communist Greater Russia.

VII. Economic Controls and Conditions

Along with political control has grown a firm economic control, designed to assure the dependence of the Moslem areas on the rest of the Soviet Union. The very boundaries of the Central Asian republics, for example, are a reflection of this policy. Although allegedly based on linguistic and cultural considerations, the boundaries exemplify a deliberate policy of cantonization to confuse local identities and to bring the natives under stronger forces of assimilation. They cut across irrigation systems, thus making central control essential. The natural economic unit of the Ferghana Valley has been gerrymandered into three parts, making each part economically dependent.

In Uzbekistan the emphasis on cotton production at the expense of cereals at a time when the population was rising made the area more dependent on food supplies from Russia than had ever been the case before. This necessity for outside supplies of food was further enhanced by the results of collectivization and dekulakization, which was carried through at a great cost in terms of livestock. All these measures have firmly integrated the economy of the area with that of Russia, have made the Moslems more amenable to Kremlin control, and have provided the Kremlin with new sources of manpower for industry.

In the early years, a Central Asiatic Economic Council handled many problems on a regional basis, together with such organizations as a Central Asiatic Cotton Committee, a Central Asiatic Water Department and an Asian Grain Company. Since these tended to foster the idea that Central Asia was a natural economic unit sufficient unto itself rather than merely a part of a single All-Union economy, these were abolished in 1934.

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That this idea was continuing is indicated by the purge in 1937 of Faizulla Khodzhayev, Uzbek premier, and Akmal Ikramov, first secretary of the Uzbek CP, who were accused of trying to lessen the economic dependence of Uzbekistan on the rest of the Soviet Union by seeking to produce less cotton and more grain.

As regards economic life, Great Russians continue to enjoy the favored position they held under the Czarist regimes. They hold the majority of good jobs in government and the party. In strictly economic enterprises, too, they enjoy favored treatment. They inevitably get the better paying jobs. In the cities the best dressed and better fed adults and children are generally Europeans. While outright discrimination in favor of Russians accounts for much of this, another factor is the fact that Russians are accorded greater educational opportunities as a result of which they are undoubtedly better qualified for the better jobs.

Living conditions for Moslems, though perhaps better than in Czarist days, are still poor, and life for the average Moslem is grim, monotonous and unrewarding. Poor housing, poor sanitation and low wages are the lot of the urban as of the rural worker. Even the press frequently complains of the poor living conditions that are the lot of the ordinary Moslem worker.

VIII. Cultural Controls and Conditions

A. Education

The Moslems have made great strides in the field of education under the Soviets. In Czarist days, illiteracy was almost universal and facilities, other than mosque schools, were virtually non-existent. Today the Moslem areas have a vast network of schools--primary, secondary and advanced--and the literacy rate has zoomed upwards. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, for example, in the five republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia had also 754,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 97,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing for the fact

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that a sizable proportion of these are Russians and other Europeans, the number of Moslems must be considerable.

Nevertheless, there are serious shortcomings in the system from the Moslem point of view. In the first place, the Moslem often receives an inferior education and therefore cannot compete on an equal footing with the Great Russian for admittance to, and success in, higher educational institutions. Course work at universities and other higher educational institutions in the USSR, even those located in Moslem areas, is carried on in Russian, so that the non-Russian student must be proficient in two languages while the Great Russian needs to know only one.

A knowledge of Russian is, in fact, a sine qua non for success in any field in the Soviet Union; and this aspect of the Kremlin's Russianization program has been stepped up since 13 March 1938, when the teaching of Russian in all non-Russian schools was made obligatory. Today Russian is the language of instruction in all higher educational courses except those which by their very content require the use of local languages such as Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc. What is more disastrous for the Moslem, however, is the fact that instruction in the Russian language often is so poor that the native student cannot pursue higher studies. Moreover, not only are the instructors not fully qualified but there is a shortage of them.

Even non-Russians who succeed in learning Russian well may find themselves handicapped by a shortage of textbooks and other materials. In Uzbekistan, for example, despite many years of work, the Uzbek Academy of Sciences had, by 1938, published only one volume of a planned four volume Russian-Uzbek dictionary. Similar complaints have been made in the five other Moslem republics and various lesser administrative units.

It appears that the Soviet rulers have fostered conditions wherein a knowledge of Russian is essential if minority peoples are to enter universities and to obtain higher paying jobs. At the same time, however, these minority peoples are taught Russian too poorly to enable them to compete effectively.

Figures quoted by the Soviets themselves support the contention that only a small percentage of the graduates of

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universities and other higher institutions of Moslem areas are Moslems. In 1946, for example, the Kazakh State University had 1,400 students of whom only 670 were Kazakhs. In March 1949, the university rector admitted that since the university's founding in 1934, only 17 per cent of all graduates had been Kazakhs. A reflection of this is found in the staff of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences: of the 1,213 scientists on its staff in 1951, only 670 were Kazakhs.

This situation is not unique to Kazakhstan. Of the 1,100 students graduated by the Uzbek State University in Samarkand from 1927 to 1947, only slightly more than half were Asiatics. In the 1946-1947 academic year, the Tadzhik Agricultural Institute graduated 14 specialists in truck gardening, not one of whom was a Tadzhik. (The first university in Tadzhikistan did not open until 1948.)

Nor can the various universities in the Moslem republics be considered as native property, run by and for the natives of each republic. The universities at Baku, Ashkabad, Samarkand, Stalinabad, Tashkent and Alma-Ata have a strong Great Russian orientation owing in part to the large number of Great Russians who teach and study there. For example, in 1940, 80 per cent of the lecturers at the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent were Russians; and in 1950, after visiting the Tashkent Medical College, Dr. Bisz (*supra*) estimated that 90 per cent of the students and a majority of the staff were Russians and that the same figures applied to the Alma-Ata university.

Furthermore, the various universities are directly subordinated to the All-Union Ministry of Higher Education, which supervises their activity. This applies also to the Central Asiatic University, under the Uzbek Government from 1933 until after the war, but now more under the control of Moscow. All subject matter and course content is rigidly controlled from the center, and textbooks have been standardized since 1935.

The primary schools present a similar picture of Great Russian dominance. This results not only from the preferential treatment accorded to Russian children but also from the fact that many Moslem children are kept out of school both because of lack of facilities and Moslem customs, or drop out after having entered. Despite Russia's vaunted nationalities policy and effective propaganda use of the existence of segregated

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schools in the United States, it should be emphasized that the Soviets also maintain a segregated school system in which European Russian children are protected from contamination by Asiatics. While the system can perhaps be explained in part by the language problem, the fact remains that segregation is practiced.

The system results, as might be expected, in preferential treatment for the Russians, i.e., in separate and unequal facilities. More schools are provided for a smaller number of Russian children than for the greater number of native children.

Soviet propaganda has frequently emphasized the "100 per cent literacy drives" which have been conducted in the various parts of the USSR and of the impressive results which have been achieved. The word "literacy" appears to have a wide range of meaning expressing anything from a sophisticated knowledge of a language to the most rudimentary grasp of the alphabet and the ability to sign one's name. Soviet experience would suggest that the latter is meant when the abolition of literacy is mentioned.

Caution should also be exercised when dealing with Soviet claims about the great quantity of books and other printed matter made available to Moslems and other minorities in their own tongue. Closer scrutiny usually reveals that instead of expressing a steady growth in the contributions of their own peoples to knowledge and culture, these lists express in large measure only translations of the works of Lenin, Stalin and other Communist writers.

B. Rewriting of History

Although there can be no question of political independence for the Moslem peoples, they are, so it is claimed, free to develop their own languages and cultures. To an extent this is true. Moslems are allowed to retain their native dances, dress, architecture, etc., while ancient masterpieces of architecture are restored and maintained. Each of the Moslem republics has a variety of institutions and societies, including an Academy of Sciences, which are concerned with the preservation and promotion of native history and culture.

Despite Communist theory, any native history that is preserved, is done so in a form agreeable to the Kremlin. The

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true facts are either suppressed, distorted or ignored. The Moslem resistance to Czarist conquest was once hailed by the Communists as "progressive," but the party line today teaches that the union of the Moslem areas with Czarist Russia was the culmination of natural evolution; that union brought with it great progress and ultimate freedom to the Moslems; that otherwise foreigners (meaning British or Turks) would have colonized the areas; and that absorption by Russia meant an end to oppressive Khan rule and to the slave trade and an opportunity for the depressed economy to prosper by a merger with the advanced economy of Russia. Anyone now daring to interpret the conquests as ordinary imperialism is in for trouble.

This new interpretation of history has resulted in the denigration of the traditional heroes and the proscribing of various national literary epics.

As late as 1947, Kunesary Kasymov, the leader of the 1837-1846 Kazakh resistance--and the national hero of the Kirghiz as well--was regarded by the Communists as a fighter for national liberation and unity. In 1947 the Kazakh writer S. Baimukhanov was given the title of Doctor of Historical Sciences by the Soviet Academy of Sciences for his book Kazakhstan in the Period from the 1820's to the 1840's, in which the traditional view of Kenesary is presented.

But in June 1949, Voprosy Istorii, in an article on Kazakh history, declared that "Kenesary's policy directed at the creation of a centralized state was an expression of his usurpational efforts to subordinate all other holders of power to himself." This was the beginning of the great shift. On 26 December 1950, Pravda, for example, published a virulent attack on mistakes of historians of Kazakhstan and made Kenesary and his brother out as black villains.

Shamyl, the great hero of Caucasian resistance, was the next to be attacked. Shamyl posed a more difficult problem, for while Kenesary was not too well known, every schoolboy was acquainted with the exploits of Shamyl, who, in fact, was described in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia as "the leader of the national liberation movement of the Caucasian mountain peoples, which was directed against the colonial policy of Czarist Russia." The denigration began in 1947 at a conference of the Historical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, when one speaker denounced Shamyl's movement as being not one

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for national liberation but a struggle "for freedom for wolves, for freedom for backwardness, oppression, darkness, Asiaticism."

Other conference participants did not receive the speech well and some even reproached Shamyl's detractor. Nothing further was heard on the subject for three years. In March 1950, Gerdar Gasanov was given the Stalin Prize for a book entitled From the History of Social and Feudal Thought in Nineteenth Century Azerbaidzhan, in which Shamyl was portrayed sympathetically. Only two months later, in May, the Prize was rescinded--an unprecedented action--and the Prize Committee administered a sharp rebuke, declaring that Gasanov's appraisal of Shamyl "basically distorts the meaning of the movement, which was reactionary and nationalistic, and was in the service of British capitalism and the Turkish Sultan." Since that event, Shamyl has been persona non grata in the USSR.

History is also being rewritten to show that the Bolsheviks had great popular support among the common people of the Moslem areas before the revolution, a completely erroneous position. The Kremlin dictates the line to be followed even for periods before the natives came in contact with the Russians. In these and other ways the Soviet Moslem historian is kept from presenting a true picture of the past to his people and is forced to serve the Kremlin by proving that the past supports present Soviet policies of Great Russian chauvinism.

Native literature is also being molded to serve the needs of the CP, and the interpretation of native literary epics--like native heroes--has been completely revised in recent years. The great Kirghiz epic Manas, portraying the struggle between the Kirghiz people and the Chinese, once viewed with favor by the Soviets, is now condemned as "anti-popular," "reactionary," and an "idealization of khans and feudal lords." The Azerbaidzhan epic Dede Korkut (also beloved by the Turkmens under the name Korkut Ata), once considered as an example of the highest type of popular poetry and of "people's expression," has somehow become a reactionary bourgeois poem. Kobylandi-batir, the Kazakh epic, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valor but "low patter, extolling violence and brigandage, steeped in the poison of hatred of other peoples, in reactionary Moslem ideology and ideas of Pan-Islamism." The Uzbek epic Alpamish has fared similarly.

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Contemporary literature must also serve the Communist line to be tolerated. On 15 August 1951, Pravda and Literaturnaya gazeta published articles denouncing the bourgeois nationalist trend in the poetry and music of Azerbaidzhan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and among the Tatars. The Pravda followed this up on 20 August with a strong reprimand to Uzbek writers and the Uzbek Institute of Linguistics and Literature. The following month the Turkmen poet Dzhuma Ikramov was severely criticized in the press in connection with a poem in praise of Turkmenistan because he had failed to specify that it was not just Turkmenistan but Soviet Turkmenistan which inspired him. Other examples could be adduced. The impossibility of writing even a short innocuous poem that is not blatantly propagandistic without being subjected to criticism has led many Moslem writers to abstain from any literary activity whatever. 15/

Another phase of this reinterpretation of history, designed further to sever the tie between Soviet Moslems and those of the rest of Islamdom, is emphasis on the theory that the Central Asian and Caucasian peoples reached a high cultural level before contact with the Arabs and Persians to whom, it is alleged, they owe little. The new Communist line is that the culture of the Soviet Moslem peoples developed separately and that the only real outside influence was by Russian writers, artists and scientists of the nineteenth century. Those who persist in stressing the impact of Turkish, Persian and Arabic cultural heritages are denounced for the heinous crime of cosmopolitanism. At the same time, possibly to establish a claim of terra irridenta, the Soviets have converted Omar Khayyam, Firdausi, Hafiz and other medieval Persian poets and writers into honorary Tadzhiks. The same fate has befallen the great Chagatai writer Mir Ali Shir Nevai, as well as others.

c. Language

With the exception of the Tadzhiks, virtually all the Moslems of Central Asia, as well as the Tatars of European Russia and the Azerbaidzhanis, speak local dialects of one and the same Turkic language group. While various cultural influences over the course of history have led to certain differentiations, it is possible, by and large, to speak of these Moslem groups as possessing linguistic unity.

The Soviet linguistic policy has endeavored to prevent at all costs the formation of a single Turkic literary language

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on the assumption that such a language would serve as a powerful weapon for the forging of a united Central Asian national movement. The creation of separate literary languages for the various Soviet minorities has often been adduced as proof of the completely disinterested solicitude on the part of Soviet authorities for the Moslems when in reality it is a policy of divide and rule. The result, as planned, has been to obscure to a great extent the resemblance of the languages to each other, except for Russian loan words, and to assure that the various Turkic languages all develop along individualistic lines.

It is not impossible that the USSR's Turkish peoples would have developed a common language had the Kremlin not interfered. In Turkestan, where Pan-Turanian ideas were strongest and where the native Turkic dialect most resembled Anatolian Turkish, there was at the time of the revolution strong support for the idea of adopting Anatolian Turkish as the common literary language for Central Asia. Elsewhere in Central Asia there was support for the use of Chagatai, which had served as a universal literary tongue until the advent of the Russians in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The new orthographies introduced by the Soviets ended, perhaps for all time, the possibility of developing a common language. The first Russian innovation came in the early 1920's when differentiated Roman scripts were devised for each language to replace the Arabic script then in use. Cyrillic was apparently not used to avoid too obvious criticism. The discarding of Arabic script accomplished several things from the Communist point of view. First of all, Arabic script was too closely synonymous with Islam, the Koran and the Shariat. Secondly, the change cut off new generations from all past literature, which might be imbued with dangerous ideas, and also emphasized the differences with Anatolian Turks, who were still using the Arabic script.

The latter advantage was nullified in 1928 when Kemalist Turkey also discarded the Arabic script for a new Roman alphabet. Turkish writings were thus again usable by Soviet Turkish peoples, so the Kremlin decreed a gradual switch to Cyrillic which encompassed all languages by 1939. Care was taken to make each alphabet slightly different, so that they would be mutually unintelligible.

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The adoption of new words for new concepts from Russian rather than from any other language has also been fostered as a matter of policy. It would appear, in fact, that the Soviets are trying to Russianize not only the vocabulary but also the grammar, syntax and even phonetics of each language, so that as time goes by each will become more and more like Russian. Soviet leaders may well be looking forward to the day when, as the result of these measures and the forced learning of Russian as a second language by all Soviet citizens, Russian will become universal and the native languages will be only quaint relics of the past.

However, Soviet linguistic policies have had very little effect on the speech habits of the bulk of the Moslem rural populations. Living in their own fairly closed communities, which offer little continuous contact with the Russians, the Moslem peasants continue to use exclusively their local dialects. Moslem peasants who learn Russian during their army service are apt to forget it after returning to their homes. Moslem girls who have learned Russian in school also are likely to forget it after they marry, for the native tongue is spoken in the home.

Admittedly, a Moslem to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well, so among the Moslem intelligentsia there is a widespread knowledge of Russian. But by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Moslems do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead they become bilingual. Moslems, even those active in the party, do not speak Russian except at work. Central Asian refugees have reported that they did not know a single case of a Moslem who had lost command of his native speech.

It would therefore appear that although the Communists have succeeded in blocking the development of a common language among the Turkish minorities, their hopes of supplanting the minority tongues with Russian has little chance of being realized.

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IX. Notes

1. See Notes - Soviet Affairs, No. 144 (20 April 1953), p. 2. The Soviet census of 17 January 1939 showed 20,302,947 Moslems, constituting 12 per cent of the total population, divided as follows:

Uzbeks	4,844,021	Kabardin	164,106
Tatar	4,300,336	Ingush	92,674
Kazakh	3,098,764	Adygei	87,273
Azerbaidzhani	2,274,305	Karachaev	75,737
Tadzhik	1,229,964	Abkaz	56,259
Kirghiz	884,300	Kurd	45,306
Daghestani	857,371	Balkar	42,656
Turkmen	511,769	Iranî	34,037
Chechen	407,690	Arab	21,793
Kara-Kalpak	185,775		

2. The Soviet classification is Central Asia (Srednyaya Aziya) and Kazakhstan.

3. The other four are presumably Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant Christianity, and Sunni Islam.

4. The best single work on the Moslem independence movements in this period is Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923. Cambridge, Mass., 1954.

5. During World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create all-Moslem units in Turkestan. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and their personnel eventually dispersed in the regular Red Army. See Richard Pipes, "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia," Middle East Journal IX (Summer, 1955), p. 301.

6. Mark Alexander, "Tensions in Soviet Central Asia," Twentieth Century XI (September, 1951).

7. Replaced in May 1952 by Shaikh Ibn Shaykh-ul-Islam Khialiadiev.

8. The Transcaucasian Central Moslem Board has nine members (three from each republic), comprising four Sunnis and five Shiites.

9. Geoskiy has since been replaced by Mohammed Sadyk Korennoy.

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10. The Muslim delegates to this conference included the following: Representing the Administrative Council for European Russia and Siberia: Shakir Ibn Shaykh-al-Islam Khalaeddinov, council president; Karullah Ibn Suleyman Yumagov, dean of the mosque of Troyev and chief qadi for the regions of Perma, Saratov, Tambov, and Ulyanovsk; and Mardjani Riza Ibn Abdul Qadyr Qabyrov, dean of the Kazan mosque and qadi for the Tatar and Udmurt ASSRs and for the region of Molotov.

Representing the Council for Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Zia-ud-Din Babakhanov, council vice-president; Zagdiwalla Gilmanov, council member for Kazakhstan; Nasarbekov, council member for Kirgizia; Abdorrashid Muzabekov, council member for Tadzhikistan; and Abdorrahman Sharipov, alternate member for Turkmenistan.

Representing the Council for Daghestan and North Caucasus: Mohammed Hadji Korbanov, interim council president; Ahmeddin Abdullaev, council secretary; and Adam Khachukov, council member and dean of the mosque of the village of Peyj (an autonomous Circassian region in the territory of Stavropol).

Representing the Council for Transcaucasia: Shaykh-ul-Islam Ali-Kade Akhund-Aga Djavad-oghly, council president; Mufti Effendi-Kade Ibrahim Abdulkarim-oghly, council vice-president and principal Sunni leader of the Transcaucasus; and Magarimov Ali-Asghar Abbas-oghly, council member.

11. See Sayed El-Hashimi, "Russia's War on Islam," Contemporary Review CLXXXVII (April, 1955).

12. Islam (Karachi), 26, 30 July and 1, 3 August 1952.

13. See Pipes, op. cit., Middle East Journal IX (Summer, 1955), p. 300.

14. See Merle Fainsod, "Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System," American Political Science Review XLIV (July, 1950).

15. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya Pravda, on 24 August 1951, complained that "the low theoretical level of Kazakh literature is explained by the fact that during the past few years many writers have abandoned creative work, not creating a single production."

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